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ABSTRACT
With positive trend inflation, the Taylor principle is not enough to guarantee a determinate equilibrium.
We provide new theoretical results on restoring determinacy in New Keynesian models with positive
trend inflation and combine these with new empirical findings on the Federal Reserve’s reaction function
before and after the Volcker disinflation to find that 1) while the Fed likely satisfied the Taylor principle
in the pre-Volcker era, the US economy was still subject to self-fulfilling fluctuations in the 1970s,
2) the US economy moved from indeterminacy to determinacy during the Volcker disinflation, and
3) the switch from indeterminacy to determinacy was due to the changes in the Fed’s response to macroeconomic
variables and the decline in trend inflation during the Volcker disinflation.
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I.     Introduction 
The pronounced decline in macroeconomic volatility since the early 1980s, frequently referred to as the Great 
Moderation, has been the source of significant debate.  One prominent explanation for this phenomenon is that 
monetary policy became more “hawkish” with the ascent of Paul Volcker as Federal Reserve chairman in 1979.
1  
Originally proposed by Taylor (1999) and Clarida et al (2000), this view emphasizes that in the late 1960s and 
1970s, the Fed systematically failed to respond sufficiently strongly to inflation, thereby leaving the US economy 
subject to self-fulfilling expectations-driven fluctuations.  The policy reversal enacted by Volcker and continued by 
Greenspan—namely the increased focus on fighting inflation—stabilized inflationary expectations and removed this 
source of economic instability.
2  The theoretical argument is based on the Taylor principle: the idea that if the central 
bank raises interest rates more than one for one with inflation, then self-fulfilling expectations will be eliminated as a 
potential source of fluctuations.  This intuitive concept is commonly used to differentiate between active (“hawkish”) 
and passive (“dovish”) policy and is a hallmark of modern monetary policy.  In addition, it has broad theoretical 
support from standard New Keynesian models with zero trend inflation in which self-fulfilling expectations can 
occur only when the Taylor principle is not followed, i.e. when monetary policy is passive.
3  Yet point estimates of 
the Fed’s response to inflation in the pre-Volcker era—regardless of whether they are less than one as in Clarida et al 
(2000) or greater than one as in Orphanides (2004)—consistently come with such large standard errors that the issue 
of whether the US economy was indeed in a state of indeterminacy, and hence subject to self-fulfilling fluctuations, 
before Volcker remains unsettled.   
In addition, recent theoretical work by Ascari and Ropele (2007), Kiley (2007) and Hornstein and Wolman 
(2005) has cast additional doubt on the issue by uncovering an intriguing result: the Taylor principle breaks down 
when trend inflation is positive (i.e., inflation rate in the steady state is positive).  Using different theoretical 
monetary models, these authors all find that achieving a unique Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) at 
historically typical inflation levels requires much stronger responses to inflation than anything observed in empirical 
estimates of central banks’ reaction functions.  These results imply that the method of attempting to assess 
determinacy solely through testing whether the central bank raises interest rates more or less than one for one with 
inflation is inadequate: one must also take into account the level of trend inflation.  For example, finding that the 
Fed’s inflation response satisfied the Taylor principle after Volcker took office – as in Clarida et al (2000) – does not 
necessarily imply that self-fulfilling expectations could not still occur since the inflation rate averaged around three 
percent per year rather than the zero percent needed for the Taylor principle to apply.  Similarly, the argument by 
                                                            
1 Other explanations emphasize inventory management or a change in the volatility of shocks.  See Kahn et al (2002) for the 
former and Blanchard and Simon (2001) or Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) for examples of the latter. 
2 This view has received recent support (see Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006)).  On the other hand, 
Orphanides (2001, 2002, 2004) argues that once one properly accounts for the central bank’s real-time forecasts, monetary 
policy-makers in the pre-Volcker era responded to inflation in much the same way as those in the Volcker and Greenspan 
periods so self-fulfilling expectations could not have been the source of instability in the 1970s.    
3 See Woodford (2003).   2 
 
Orphanides (2002) that monetary policy-makers satisfied the Taylor principle even before Volcker became chairman 
does not necessarily invalidate the conclusion of Taylor (1999) and Clarida et al (2000) that the US economy moved 
from indeterminacy to determinacy around the time of the Volcker disinflation: the same response to inflation by the 
central bank can lead to determinacy at low levels of inflation but indeterminacy at higher levels of inflation.  Thus, 
it could be that the Volcker disinflation of 1979-1982, by lowering average inflation, was enough to shift the US 
economy from indeterminacy to the determinacy region even with no change in the response of the central bank to 
macroeconomic variables.  
  This paper offers two main contributions.  First, we provide new theoretical results on the effects of 
endogenous monetary policy for determinacy in New Keynesian models with positive trend inflation.  Second, we 
combine these theoretical results with empirical evidence on actual monetary policy to provide novel insight into 
how monetary policy changes may have affected the stability of the US economy over the last forty years.  For the 
former, we build on the work of Ascari and Ropele (2007), Kiley (2007), and Hornstein and Wolman (2005) and 
show that determinacy in New Keynesian models under positive trend inflation depends not just on the central 
bank’s response to inflation and the output gap, as is the case under zero trend inflation, but rather is also a function 
of many other components of endogenous monetary policy that are commonly found to be empirically important.  
Specifically, we find that interest smoothing helps reduce the minimum long-run response of interest rates to 
inflation needed to ensure determinacy.  This differs substantially from the zero trend inflation case, in which inertia 
in interest rate decisions has no effect on determinacy prospects conditional on the long-run response of interest rates 
to inflation.  We also find that price-level targeting helps achieve determinacy under positive trend inflation, even 
when the central bank does not force the price level to fully return to its target path.    Finally, while Ascari and 
Ropele (2007) emphasize the potentially destabilizing role of responding to the output gap under positive trend 
inflation, we show that responding to output growth can help restore determinacy for plausible inflation responses.  
This finding provides new support for Walsh (2003) and Orphanides and Williams (2006), who call for monetary 
policy makers to respond to output growth rather than the level of the output gap.  More generally, we show that 
positive trend inflation makes stabilization policy more valuable and calls for a more aggressive policy response to 
inflation even if an economy stays in the determinacy region.   
These results are not just theoretical curiosities since empirical work has found evidence for each of these 
measures in monetary policy decisions.  Interest smoothing is a particularly well-known empirical feature of interest-
rate decision-making.
4  Gorodnichenko and Shapiro (2007) provide evidence for partial price-level targeting in the 
US.  Finally, Ireland (2004) finds that the Fed responds to both the output gap and output growth.  Thus, given that 
these policy actions are empirically and theoretically relevant, the key implication is that one cannot study the 
determinacy prospects of the economy without considering simultaneously 1) the level of trend inflation, 2) the 
                                                            
4 See Clarida et al (2000) or Blinder and Reis (2005) for example. 3 
 
Fed’s response to inflation and its response to the output gap, output growth, price-level gap, and the degree of 
interest smoothing, and 3) the model of the economy.    
  We revisit the issue of possible changes in monetary policy over the last forty years, as well as the 
implications for economic stability, using a two-step approach.  In the first step, we estimate the Fed’s reaction 
function before and after the Volcker disinflation.  We follow Orphanides (2004) and use the Greenbook forecasts 
prepared by the Federal Reserve staff before each meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) as real-
time measures of expected inflation, output growth, and the output gap.  Like the previous literature, we find 
ambiguous results as to the hypothesis of whether the Taylor principle was satisfied before the Volcker disinflation 
depending on the exact empirical specification, with large standard errors that do not permit us to clearly reject this 
hypothesis.  We also find that while the Fed’s long-run response to inflation is higher in the latter period, the 
difference is not consistently statistically significant.  Importantly, we uncover other ways in which monetary policy 
has changed.  First, the persistence of interest rate changes has gone up.  Second, the Fed’s response to output growth 
has gone up dramatically, while the response to the output gap decreased (although not statistically significantly).  
These changes, according to our theoretical results, make determinacy a more likely outcome. 
  In the second step, we combine the empirical distribution of our parameter estimates of the Taylor rule with 
a calibrated standard New Keynesian model and different estimates of trend inflation to infer the likelihood that the 
US economy was in a determinate equilibrium each period.  We find that despite the substantial uncertainty about 
whether or not the Taylor principle was satisfied in the pre-Volcker era, the probability that the US economy was in 
the determinacy region in the 1970s’s is zero according to our preferred empirical specification.  This reflects the 
combined effects of a response to inflation that was close to one, a non-existent response to output growth, relatively 
little interest smoothing, and, most importantly, high trend inflation over this time period.  On the other hand, given 
the Fed’s response function since the early 1980s and the low average rate of inflation over this time period, 3%, we 
conclude that the probability that the US economy has been in a determinate equilibrium since the Volcker 
disinflation exceeds 99% according to our preferred empirical specification.  Thus, we concur with the original 
conclusion of Clarida et al (2000).  However, whereas these authors reach their conclusion primarily based on testing 
for the Taylor principle over each period, we argue that the switch from indeterminacy to determinacy was due to 
several factors, none of which would likely have sufficed on their own.  For example, taking the Fed’s pre-Volcker 
response function and replacing any of the individual responses to macroeconomic variables with their post-1982 
value would have had no effect on determinacy given the high average inflation rate in the 1970s.  Instead, the most 
important factors causing the switch away from indeterminacy were the higher inflation response combined the 
decrease in the trend level of inflation.   
Our paper is closely related to Cogley and Sbordone (2008).  They find that controlling for trend inflation 
has important implications in the estimation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, whereas we conclude that 
accounting for trend inflation is necessary to properly assess the effectiveness of monetary policy in stabilizing the 
economy.  In a sense, one may associate the end of the Great Inflation as a source of the Great Moderation.  To 4 
 
support this view, we estimate a time-varying parameter version of the Taylor rule from which we extract a measure 
of time-varying trend inflation and therefore also a time series for the likelihood that the US economy was in the 
determinacy region.  This series indicates that the probability of determinacy went from 0% in 1980 to 90% in 1984, 
which is the date most commonly associated with the start of the Great Moderation (McConnell and Perez-Quirós, 
(2000)).  To further support this notion, we document robust cross-country empirical evidence supporting a positive 
link between trend inflation and GDP volatility.  Devoting more effort to understanding the determinants of trend 
inflation, as in Sargent (1999), Primiceri (2006) or Ireland (2007), and the Volcker disinflation of 1979-1982 in 
particular, is likely to be a fruitful area for future research. 
While our baseline results indicate that the US economy has most likely been within the determinacy region 
since the Volcker disinflation, we also find that higher levels of trend inflation such as those reached in the 1970s 
could bring the US economy to the brink of the indeterminacy region.  In our counterfactual experiments, we find 
that the complete elimination of the Fed’s current response to the output gap would remove virtually any chance of 
indeterminacy, even at 1970s levels of inflation.  But this does not imply that central banks should, in general, not 
respond to the real side of the economy.  The last result holds only because, since Volcker, the Fed has been 
responding strongly to output growth.  Were the Fed to stop responding to both the output gap and output growth, 
indeterminacy at higher inflation rates would become an even more likely outcome.   
  Our approach is also very closely related to Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006).  
Both papers address the same question of whether the US economy has switched from indeterminacy to determinacy 
because of monetary policy changes, and both reach the same conclusion as us.  However, our approaches are quite 
different.  First, we emphasize the importance of allowing for positive trend inflation, whereas their models are based 
on zero-trend-inflation approximations.
5  Thus, their models do not take into account the effects on determinacy of 
the lower trend inflation brought about by the Volcker disinflation.  Second, we consider a larger set of policy 
responses for the central bank, which we argue has significant implications for determinacy as well.
6  Third, we 
estimate the parameters of the Taylor rule using real-time Fed forecasts, whereas these papers impose rational 
expectations on the central bank in their estimation.   Fourth, we allow for time-varying parameters in the Taylor rule 
as well as time-varying trend inflation.  Finally, we draw our conclusions about determinacy by feeding our 
empirical estimates of the Taylor rule into a pre-specified model, whereas they estimate the structural parameters of 
the DSGE model jointly with the Taylor rule.  The pros and cons of the latter are well-known: greater efficiency in 
estimation as long as the model is specified correctly.  However, if any part of the model is misspecified, this can 
                                                            
5 In the case of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), they use the standard NKPC expressed in terms of deviations from a non-zero 
trend inflation.  This is equivalent to using a Calvo pricing model in which non-reoptimized prices are fully indexed to trend 
inflation.  This eliminates all of the determinacy implications of positive trend inflation, as described in section 4.3. 
6 For example, neither Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) nor Boivin and Giannoni (2006) allow for a response to output growth in 
the Taylor rule.   5 
 
affect all of the other estimated parameters.
7  Our approach instead allows us to estimate the parameters of the Taylor 
rule using real-time data while imposing as few restrictions as possible.  We are then free to consider the 
implications of these parameters for any model.
8  While much more flexible than estimating a DSGE model, our 
approach does have two key limitations.  First, we are forced to select rather than estimate some parameter values for 
the model.  Second, because we do not estimate the shock processes, we cannot quantify the effect of our results as 
completely as in a fully specified and estimated DSGE model.   
  The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 presents the model, while section 3 presents new theoretical 
results on determinacy under positive trend inflation.  Section 4 presents our Taylor rule estimates and their 
implications for US determinacy since the 1970s, as well as robustness exercises.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
II.     Model  
We rely on a standard New Keynesian model, in which we focus on allowing for positive trend inflation.  We use the 
model to illustrate the importance of positive trend inflation for determinacy of REE and point to mechanisms that 
can enlarge or reduce the region of determinacy for various policy rules.   
 
2.1 The  Model 
The representative consumer maximizes expected utility over consumption (C) and labor (N), 
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Note that labor is provided individually to a continuum of industries.  The budget constraint at time t+j is given by 
      
    
    
   
              





            
    
       
where S is the stock of bonds held, W(i) is the nominal wage paid by sector i, P is the price index of the consumption 
good, R is the nominal interest rate, and T is a lump-sum transfer from ownership of firms.  The first order conditions 
for the consumer are given by 
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7 Estimation of DSGE models under indeterminacy also raises additional issues such as selecting one of many equilibrium 
outcomes. 
8 For example, while our baseline model relies on Calvo (1983) price setting, we can just as easily apply our Taylor rule 
estimates to a model with staggered price setting (as in Taylor (1977)), which we do in section 4.5.  This is not the case using an 
estimated DSGE model, knowing that the estimated Taylor rule coefficients are sensitive to the price-setting assumptions of the 
model. 6 
 
As we abstract away from investment, international trade, and government consumption, aggregate consumption 
must equal the production of the final good (Y), which is an aggregate of intermediate goods produced by a 
continuum of firms indexed by i based on the CES aggregator 
                  
   





   
 
where θ is the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods.  Profit-maximization by perfectly-competitive 
final goods producers yields the demand curve for each intermediate good i 
            





and the aggregate price index 
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Intermediate goods are produced by a continuum of monopolistic competitors with a production function 
with only labor as an input and constant returns to scale 
                
where A is the aggregate productivity level.  The log of productivity follows a random walk with drift process 
                      
 . 
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that each period, firms face a constant probability   of not being able to change 
their price.  Defining       to be the reset price of a firm i when it has the opportunity to change its price, the firm 
chooses its reset price to maximize the expected discounted stream of future profits  
             ,                            
 
   
. 
where   ,    is the stochastic discount factor and          is the firm-specific marginal cost.  Substituting the firm’s 
demand curve into the expression and maximizing with respect to       yields the first-order condition 
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Noting that   
        
    
    
       
        
       
    
    
 
     
 





   




   and substituting in this expression for firm-
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where we have dropped individual firm subscripts since all firms which can reset their price at time t will choose the 
same price.
9  Finally, we want to express the reset price equation as a function of stationary variables.  To do so, first 
note that the flexible price level of output is given by  
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The output gap can then be defined as        /   
 .  Also, note that the stochastic discount factor is given by 
  ,     
       
         
          
  
 
   
. 
Finally, defining          /      as the growth rate of output and Π      /     as the gross inflation rate, we can 
rewrite the expression for the relative reset price in terms of stationary variables  
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The price level can be decomposed into a function of the current reset price and an autoregressive component 
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   . 
Normalizing both sides by the current price level and rearranging yields an alternative representation in terms of 
stationary variables 
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2.2 Log-Linearization 
Following most of the literature, we focus on a first-order approximation to the model but depart from the standard 
approach in allowing for the trend level of inflation     l o g   Π      to be greater than or equal to zero.  This has no 
effect on the first-order conditions of the consumer’s problem.  We let lower-case letters denoted the log-deviation of 
a variable from its steady-state value with bt denoting the log-linearized reset price relative to price level.  We can 
write the dynamic IS equation as 
                                                            
9 Sticky-price models with positive trend inflation typically require that one keep track of the dynamics of price dispersion.  We 
do not need to do so here because we express the reset price equation in terms of the output gap rather than aggregate marginal 
costs.  It is easy to show that the relationship between firm-specific and aggregate marginal costs is a function of aggregate price 
dispersion, but as shown above, the link between firm-specific marginal costs and the output gap is not.  Hence, we do not 
explicitly model the dynamics of price dispersion.  Note that this result is sensitive to the structure of the model: if we assume 
homogeneous labor supply rather than firm-specific labor supply (as in section 4.4), then the reset price equation is necessarily a 
function of price dispersion and we must keep track of the dynamics of price dispersion in solving the model. 8 
 
                      
and the link between output growth and the change in the output gap as 
                    
 . 
However, non-zero trend inflation has important effects on the linearization of the price-setting equations.  
First, positive trend inflation      0    implies that reset prices (relative to price level) will, on average, be higher than 
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as long as the elasticity of substitution is greater than 1.  This reflects the fact that a fixed reset price will erode in 
real terms because of inflation.  This implies that (log-linearized) inflation becomes less sensitive to changes in the 
(log-linearized) relative reset price 
     
1   Π     
 Π           
because, on average, firms who change prices set them above the average price level and therefore account for a 
smaller share of expenditures than others. 
  More importantly for determinacy issues, the reset price equation is also sensitive to trend inflation.  The 
log-linearized version of equation (1) is 
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where                   Π    and        Π     / .
10  Note that under zero-trend inflation,        .  Consider how positive 
trend inflation affects the relative reset price.  First, higher trend inflation raises   , so that the weights in the output 
gap term shift away from the current gap and more towards future output gaps.  This reflects the fact that as the 
relative reset price falls over time, the firm’s future losses will tend to grow very rapidly.  Thus, a sticky-price firm 
must be relatively more concerned with marginal costs far in the future when trend inflation is positive.  Second, the 
relative reset price now depends on the discounted sum of future differences between output growth and interest 
rates.  Note that this term disappears when     0 .  This factor captures the scale effect of aggregate demand in the 
future.  The higher aggregate demand is expected to be in the future, the bigger the firm’s losses will be from having 
a deflated price.  The interest rate captures the discounting of future gains.  When     0 , these two factors cancel out 
on average.  Positive    , however, induces the potential for much bigger losses in the future which makes these 
effects first-order.  Thus, as with the output gap, positive trend inflation induces more forward-looking behavior on 
                                                            
10 Note that for the reset price to have a well-defined solution in the steady-state requires that     1 .  See Bakhshi et al (2007). 9 
 
the part of firms.  Third, positive     raises the coefficient on expected inflation.  This reflects the fact that the higher 
is expected inflation, the more rapidly the firm’s price will depreciate, the higher it must set its reset price.  Thus, 
positive     trend inflation makes firms more forward-looking in their price-setting decisions by raising the importance 
of future marginal costs and inflation, as well as by inducing them to also pay attention to future output growth and 
interest rates. 
The log-linearized reset price equation can also be rewritten in a more convenient form as 
      1  /               
where the variables dt and et follow respectively 
      1      1                              1   1                       
                                        . 
 
2.3  Calibration 
Allowing for positive trend inflation increases the state space of the model and makes analytical solutions infeasible.  
Thus, all of our determinacy results are numerical.  We calibrate the model as follows.  The Frisch labor supply 
elasticity, η, is set to 1.  We let β=0.99 and the steady-state growth rate of real GDP per capita be 1.5% per year 
(          1.015 .  ), which matches the U.S. rate from 1969 to 2002.  The elasticity of substitution θ is set to 10, which 
corresponds to a markup of 11%. This size of the markup is consistent with estimates presented in Burnside (1996) 
and Basu and Fernald (1997).  Finally, the degree of price stickiness ( ) is set to 0.55, which amounts to firms 
resetting prices approximately every 7 months on average.  This is midway between the micro estimates of Bils and 
Klenow (2004), who find that firms change prices every 4 to 5 months, and those of Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), 
who find that firms change prices every 9 to 11 months.  We will investigate the robustness of our results to these 
parameters in subsequent sections.   
 
III.    Equilibrium Determinacy under Positive Trend Inflation 
To close the model, we need to specify how monetary policy-makers set interest rates.  One common description is a 
simple Taylor rule, expressed in log-deviations from steady-state values: 
              (2)   
in which the central bank sets interest rates as a function of contemporaneous (j=0) or future (j>0) inflation.
11  As 
documented in Woodford (2003), such a rule, when applied to a model like the one presented here with zero trend 
inflation, yields a simple and intuitive condition for the existence of a unique rational expectations equilibrium:  π > 
                                                            
11 Our results for j = -1 are similar to results for j = 0 and hence are not reported.  10 
 
1.
12  This result, commonly known as the Taylor Principle, states that central banks must raise interest rates by more 
than one-for-one with (expected) inflation to eliminate the possibility of sunspot fluctuations.   
  Yet, as emphasized in Ascari and Ropele (2007), Kiley (2007), and Hornstein and Wolman (2005), the 
Taylor principle loses its potency in environments with positive trend inflation.  Panel A in Figure 1 presents the 
minimum response of the central bank to inflation necessary to ensure the existence of a unique rational expectations 
equilibrium for both contemporaneous (j = 0) and forward-looking (j = 1) Taylor rules.
13  As found by Ascari and 
Ropele (2007), Kiley (2007), and Hornstein and Wolman (2005), the basic Taylor principle breaks down when the 
trend inflation rate rises.  With a contemporaneous Taylor rule, after inflation exceeds 1.2 percent per year, the 
minimum response needed by the central bank starts to rise.  With trend inflation of 6 percent a year, as was the case 
in the 1970s, the central bank would have to raise interest rates by almost ten times the increase in the inflation rate 
to sustain a determinate REE.  Using forward-looking Taylor rules, the results are even more dramatic.  As soon as 
trend inflation slightly exceeds 0 percent per year, the minimum response to inflation exceeds our maximum bound 
of 20, implying that a determinate REE does not exist for plausible inflation responses even at very low inflation 
rates.  This finding is in line with Woodford (2003, p. 516) and others who report that purely forward-looking rules 
may be more subject to indeterminacy.
14  In our case, the breakdown of the basic Taylor principle is amplified 
because of the growing importance of forward-looking behavior in price-setting when trend inflation rises.   Note 
that this result is not limited to Calvo pricing.  Kiley (2007) and Hornstein and Wolman (2005) find similar results 
using staggered contracts a la Taylor (1977).
15   
  In the rest of this section, we investigate how modifications of the basic Taylor rule affect the prospects for a 
determinate equilibrium under positive trend inflation.  First, we reproduce the results of Ascari and Ropele (2007), 
Kiley (2007), and Hornstein and Wolman (2005) that focus on adding a response to the output gap.  Second, we 
provide new results on the determinacy implications of responding to output growth and discuss the distinction 
between responding to the theoretical output gap versus a trend measure of the output gap, as well as the distinction 
between responding to the growth rate in output versus the growth rate in the output gap.  Third, we provide new 
results on the determinacy implications of adding inertia to the policy rule via an interest smoothing motive and via 
price level targeting.  Finally, we demonstrate that positive trend inflation generally requires stronger responses by 
the central bank to achieve stabilization than under zero trend inflation within the determinacy region.   
                                                            
12 Forward-looking rules, j ≥ 1, typically also place a constraint on the maximum value of    to sustain a unique REE.  See 
Woodford (2003, chapter 4). 
13 For simplicity, we focus on the minimum response of inflation necessary for a unique REE, and do not plot the maximum 
values typical in forward-looking responses.  This is because these, when present, are always at levels far beyond anything seen 
in empirical estimates of Taylor rules.   
14 Furthermore, Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Woodford (2003) show that making the response to expected inflation more 
aggressive can conflict with ensuring determinacy because there is an upper bound on how aggressive the response to inflation 
can be in the region of determinacy.  This explains why stronger responses to expected inflation do not expand the region of 
determinacy in the forward-looking rule.  
15  Appendix Figure A1 reproduces all of our theoretical findings on determinacy with staggered price setting (under the 
assumption that prices are set for 3 quarters), yielding qualitatively similar results.  11 
 
 
3.1  Responding to the Output Gap 
One variation on the basic Taylor rule which has received much attention in the literature is allowing for the central 
bank to respond to the output gap as follows  
                         (3)   
This reflects the fact that empirical estimates of Taylor rules typically find a positive response of interest rates to the 
real side of the economy as well as the fact that responding to the output gap can be stabilizing in theory.  For 
example, Woodford (2003) shows that in a model similar to the one presented above with zero trend inflation, a 
contemporaneous (j=0) Taylor rule will ensure a determinate REE if  
    
 1   
 
    1  
which is commonly known as the Generalized Taylor Principle.
16  This result follows from the fact that in the steady-
state, there is a positive relationship between inflation and the output gap.  Thus, a permanent one percent increase in 
inflation leads to a long-run increase in the output gap (of   
 1     /   percent so that the left-hand side of the Generalized Taylor Principle corresponds to the long-run 
increase in the interest rate from a permanent one-percent increase in inflation.  If this is greater than one, then 
determinacy is ensured.  The Generalized Taylor Principle implies that determinacy can be achieved by a sufficiently 
strong response to the output gap, a sufficiently strong response to inflation, or some combination thereof.  In any 
case, responding to the output gap is clearly positive in terms of ensuring determinacy. 
  Yet as demonstrated by Ascari and Ropele (2007) and Kiley (2007), this extension of the Taylor principle 
breaks down with positive trend inflation because the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) turns 
negative for sufficiently high level of trend inflation.  Panel B in Figure 1 presents the minimum response to inflation 
necessary to achieve determinacy for different levels of trend inflation and different responses to the output gap.  The 
results are nonlinear.  Small but positive responses to the output gap lead to lower minimum responses to inflation to 
achieve determinacy, as was the case with zero trend inflation.  However, stronger responses to the output gap 
(generally greater than 0.5) have the opposite effect and require bigger responses to inflation to sustain a unique 
REE.  This result has important policy implications which clash with those implied by the Generalized Taylor 
Principle.  With positive trend inflation, strong responses to the output gap can be destabilizing rather than 
stabilizing. 
It is worth emphasizing that, in terms of determinacy, these results do not hinge on having the central bank 
respond to the theoretical output gap, i.e. the deviation of output from the flexible price level of output, which may 
be unobservable to central bankers.  Similar results obtain if one considers responses by the central bank to the 
deviation of output from its trend, which is closer conceptually to output gap measures typically used by central 
                                                            
16 In our model,    1     1      /   1        . 12 
 
bankers.  Defining a new measure of trend output    
  as the level of output that would occur if technology was equal 
to its trend level (  
 )  
   





     
  
  
then one can define an alternative measure of the gap as the deviation of output from its trend: 
  
                   
 . 
It follows that the theoretical output gap (  ), i.e. the deviation of output from its flexible price level, follows 
       
       
where              /  
   is the deviation of technology from its trend.
17   
The only difference between the theoretical output gap and the gap relative to trend is the exogenous process 
for technology   .  Thus, if we assume that the central bank responds to the trend measure of the gap   
 , this will be 
identical to having our original Taylor rule in which the central bank responds to the theoretical output gap   , 
augmented with a response to technology.  However, because the latter is exogenous and Woodford (2003) shows 
that only the central bank’s response (or lack thereof) to endogenous variables matters for determinacy, it will have 
no effect on determinacy.  Thus, while the issue of whether the central bank responds to the theoretical output gap    
or trend output gap   
  will certainly matter for economic stabilization, it does not affect the determinacy regions. 
 
3.2  Responding to Output Growth 
The results for responding to the output gap under positive trend inflation call into question whether central banks 
should be responding to the real side of the economy at all, even when one ignores the uncertainty regarding real-
time measurement of the output gap.  Yet recent work by Walsh (2003) and Orphanides and Williams (2006) has 
emphasized an alternative real variable that monetary policy makers can respond to for stabilization purposes: output 
growth.  This policy, sometimes referred to as a “speed limit”, has the advantage of greatly reducing measurement 
issues since output growth is directly observable.  To determine how such a policy might affect determinacy with 
trend inflation, we consider the following Taylor rule 
                           (4)   
Panel C in Figure 1 presents the minimum response to inflation needed by the central bank to ensure 
determinacy for different trend inflation rates and responses to output growth.  For contemporaneous Taylor rules, 
having the central bank respond to output growth helps ensure determinacy of the equilibrium, but this effect is much 
weaker under forward-looking Taylor rules.  The minimum level of inflation response needed for determinacy falls 
as the response to output growth increases.  In fact, a more general principle appears to be at work here: determinacy 
                                                            
17 Note that in our model technology follows a random walk process and hence technology does not deviate from trend. 
However, one may consider alternative processes such as ARI(1,1) or trend stationary technology so that at has meaningful 
variation.  13 
 
appears to be guaranteed for any positive trend inflation rate when the Fed responds to both inflation and current 
output growth by more than one-for-one.   
There are two channels through which responding to output growth helps achieve determinacy.  First, 
responding to the output growth rate effectively makes the policy reaction function history-dependent because it 
responds to lagged output.  Second, responding to output growth amplifies the central bank’s response to inflation.  
To see this, consider a permanent increase in inflation   .  Substituting in for output growth using the dynamic IS 
equation and re-arranging yields the following expression for real interest rates, assuming that      1 ,  
         
    1
1     
  . 
Satisfying the Taylor principle,     1 , ensures that the real interest rate rises with expected inflation.  But, as 
demonstrated in section 3.1, this is generally not sufficient to establish determinacy with positive trend inflation.  
Allowing for a positive response to output growth, however, amplifies the magnitude of the response of real interest 
rates to expected inflation.  This is because when expected inflation rises, the real interest rate rises as long as 
    1 .  This causes output to fall but output growth is expected to rise via the dynamic IS equation (low but rising).  
Higher expected output growth further raises the real interest rate when      0  which further lowers output and 
raises expected output growth, etc.   The size of the multiplier for the increase in real interest rates is given by 
1/(1    ).  As the central bank’s response to output growth approaches one, the multiplier approaches infinity.  
This real interest rate multiplier effect partially accounts for why strong responses to output growth help restore 
determinacy.  Also note that similar to our results for the baseline Taylor rule with response only to inflation, making 
the response to inflation more aggressive does not guarantee determinacy for forward-looking rules.   
Overall, our findings suggest that targeting real variables is not automatically destabilizing under positive 
trend inflation.  Instead, strong responses to output growth help restore the basic Taylor principle whereas strong 
responses to the output gap can be destabilizing.  In addition, because output growth is readily observable and 
subject to much less measurement error than the output gap, having the central bank follow a “speed limit” policy of 
the type proposed by Walsh (2003) and Orphanides and Williams (2006) appears to be both feasible in real time and 
helpful in diminishing the possibility of sunspot fluctuations.
18   
 
3.3  Interest Rate Smoothing 
An additional extension to the basic Taylor rule which has become exceedingly common is allowing for interest 
smoothing as follows 
               1               (5)   
                                                            
18 While “speed limit” policies are sometimes expressed in terms of responses to the growth rate of the output gap rather than the 
growth rate of output, this distinction is irrelevant for determinacy issues.  This is because the growth rate of the output gap is 
equal to the growth rate of output minus the innovation to technology.  Thus, substituting the growth rate of the gap into the 
Taylor rule, then substituting out the growth in the gap with the growth in output yields an identical response of the central bank 
to endogenous variables, thereby yielding the same determinacy region. 14 
 
where ρ is the degree of interest smoothing.  In this case,    can be interpreted as the long-run response of interest 
rates to a permanent one-percentage point increase in inflation.  As shown in Woodford (2003), such rules are also 
consistent with the Taylor principle, requiring that the long-run response to inflation    be greater than one for any 
degree of interest smoothing between 0 and 1.  Thus, under zero trend inflation, interest smoothing has no effect on 
determinacy of the equilibrium, conditional on the long-run response of interest rates to inflation.  On the other hand, 
super-inertial rules (in which ρ≥1) guarantee determinacy for any positive response to inflation, since these imply an 
infinite long-run response of interest rates to permanent changes in inflation.  Furthermore, including lagged interest 
rates in the reaction function makes the policy rule history-dependent which helps to anchor expectations.
   
  We investigate the effect of introducing interest smoothing in the Taylor rule under positive trend inflation in 
Panel D of Figure 1.
19  For both contemporaneous and forward-looking Taylor rules, higher interest smoothing 
makes determinacy sustainable at lower levels of   .
20  With interest smoothing of the order of 0.9, a value 
frequently found in empirical work, the Taylor principle is restored for inflation rates as high as 6 percent.  This 
differs from the zero trend inflation case: under positive trend inflation, interest smoothing helps achieve 
determinacy even conditional on the long-run response to inflation.  This suggests that history-dependence is 
particularly useful in improving the determinacy properties of interest rate rules when     0 .  In addition, super-
inertial rules (in which ρ≥1) continue to guarantee determinacy for any positive response to the inflation rate, exactly 
as was the case with     0 zero.  Note also that once interest rate smoothing is applied, the dramatic difference in 
determinacy outcomes between contemporaneous and forward-looking Taylor rules dissipates. 
 
3.4  Price Level Targeting 
Another policy approach often considered is price-level targeting (PLT).  To model this, we follow Gorodnichenko 
and Shapiro (2007) and write the Taylor rule as 
           
where dpt is the log deviation of the price level (  ) from its target path (  
 ) 
                    
                 . 
The price gap depends on the lagged price gap and the current deviation of inflation from the target.  The parameter 
δ indicates how “strict” price-level targeting is.  In the case of δ = 0, the price-level gap is just the deviation of 
inflation from its target and the Taylor rule collapses to the basic inflation targeting case.  When δ=1, we have strict 
price level targeting in which the central bank acts to return the price level completely back to the target level after a 
                                                            
19 Note that for ρ=1, we rewrite the Taylor rule as                     . 
20 Sveen and Weinke (2005) find a similar result but in the context of a New Keynesian model with firm-specific capital and 
zero trend inflation. 15 
 
shock.  The case of 0 < δ < 1 is “partial” price level targeting, in which the central bank forces the price level to 
return only partway to the original target path.
21   
  By quasi-differencing the Taylor rule after substituting in the price gap process, one can readily show that 
this policy is equivalent to the following Taylor rule: 
                   
This is observationally equivalent to the Taylor rule with interest smoothing.  Thus, when the central bank pursues 
strict PLT (δ = 1), this is equivalent to the central bank having a super-inertial rule.  Determinacy is therefore 
guaranteed for any positive response to the price level (and therefore inflation).  Thus, the result of Woodford (2003) 
that strict PLT guarantees determinacy in a Calvo type model with zero trend inflation continues to hold (at least 
numerically) under positive trend inflation.  In addition, partial PLT (0<δ<1) will yield the exact same results as 
interest smoothing.  The stricter the PLT (the higher the δ), the smaller the long-run response to inflation will need to 
be to sustain a determinate REE for positive trend levels of inflation.   
 
3.5  Summary of Determinacy Results under Positive Trend Inflation 
The fact that the basic Taylor principle breaks down with positive trend inflation raises important issues about 
monetary policy.  The first issue is whether there are other policy actions that can help ensure determinacy.  Previous 
work has shown that responding to the output gap can actually further destabilize the economy when trend inflation 
is positive, eliminating one potential source of stability frequently utilized in theoretical and empirical work.  Our 
analysis shows three alternative policies which can help restore determinacy.  Responding to output growth, rather 
than the output gap, is one way that policy-makers can respond to the real side of the economy in a stabilizing 
manner.  Interest rate inertia and price level targeting are also useful in achieving determinacy for an economy with 
positive trend inflation.  The second issue is whether an economy is subject to sunspot equilibria depends not only on 
the central bank’s response function but also on the level of trend inflation.  Thus, a policy rule which is stabilizing 
for one level of inflation may not be sufficient for determinacy at a higher level of inflation.  In other words, changes 
in the central bank’s inflation target can move an economy from determinacy to indeterminacy even with no change 
in the central bank’s response to macroeconomic variables.  Determinacy will therefore tend to be model specific and 
sensitive to both the structure and parameters of the model.  This implies that exercises focusing only on the inflation 
response in a Taylor rule will in general be insufficient to answer whether this rule is consistent with a determinate 
equilibrium.
22   
                                                            
21 This could also be interpreted as targeting an average level of inflation. Suppose that the target for average inflation is 3% 
over 5 years. Then below-target inflation is later compensated with above target inflation. 
22 Davig and Leeper (2007) argue that the possibility of the central banker switching to a policy rule consistent with determinacy 
(good policy) can lead to determinant outcomes even during times when the central banker’s policy rule is not sufficiently 
aggressive to guarantee determinacy (bad policy). In other words, the possibility of switching to the good policy mitigates the 
effects of the bad policy. However, Davig and Leeper observe that the bad policy will still lead to increased volatility of 
macroeconomic variables.  Hence, we continue to associate periods of bad policy with periods of increased volatility.  16 
 
3.6  The Effects of Positive Trend Inflation on Economic Stabilization within the Determinacy Region 
While all of our results have focused on the determinacy implications of positive trend inflation, one can also 
consider the effects of trend inflation on economic stabilization within the determinacy region.  Specifically, the 
question we want to address is how strongly the central bank should respond to inflation under positive trend 
inflation to achieve the same welfare from stabilization as under zero trend inflation. To assess the welfare gains due 
to stabilization policies under zero and positive trend inflation, we derive the second order approximation to the 
consumer utility function augmented with external habit formation in consumption when     can differ from zero.
 23,24  
 
Proposition 1: The second order approximation to consumer utility  
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       / 1      ,      Π     / 1    Π      ,  h is the degree of habit formation in consumption, and Ht is the 
exogenously determined (“external”) habit which is equal to lagged consumption.  
Proof: see Appendix A. 
 
It is straightforward to show that, for any plausible calibration of  , ,  and    , the weight on inflation 
variability increases with the level of trend inflation    . Hence, the central result of this proposition is that positive 
trend inflation makes stabilization (specifically with respect to inflation) more valuable.  This finding is intuitive: the 
level of cross-sectional price dispersion increases with positive trend inflation and hence more variable inflation has 
a larger effect on welfare.  
                                                            
23 Aruoba and Schorfheide (2009) investigate how trend inflation affects social welfare in a steady state. The first order effects 
documented in this paper are not dependent on our policy rules which are functions of deviations of inflation, output gap or any 
other relevant variable from a steady state.  Hence, our analysis is more informative about the value of stabilization policies. 
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) consider the benefits of stabilization policies with positive trend inflation.  However, their 
calibration imposes that 80 percent of firms can reset prices every period and that the elasticity of demand is relatively low 
implying low strategic complementarity.  With this calibration, positive trend inflation set at low levels as calibrated in Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2007) is not likely to lead to any significant departures from the standard Taylor principle, which is consistent 
with our robustness analysis below.  Ascari and Ropele (2007) evaluate the effects of inflation and output gap variability given 
positive trend inflation. Our analysis is different in two key respects. First, they postulate a loss function rather than derive it as a 
second order approximation to consumer utility. Second, they consider policies under discretion or commitment while we 
analyze Taylor-type rules.   
24 Note that the technology shock is the only economic disturbance in our model. Without habit formation, permanent 
innovations to the level of technology have no effects on inflation or the output gap.  We also experimented with using transitory 
changes in technology and no habit formation and obtained qualitatively similar results.   17 
 
Using the second order approximation to consumer utility and the contemporaneous Taylor rule as in 
equation (2), we can assess what policy response    is required to maintain a fixed level of expected utility as trend 
inflation     increases.
25 Let us define   |   ,  as the minimal policy response necessary to achieve utility level   given 
trend inflation    . Figure 2 shows the ratio   |   , /  | ,  for different     where   is equal to the level of utility a 
policymaker can achieve with the lowest    which yields determinacy at 6 percent trend inflation, the highest level 
of trend inflation in our analysis. Irrespective of what degree of habit formation h we choose, the policymaker must 
be increasingly aggressive to inflation as     rises. We conclude that the key effect of positive trend inflation on 
determinacy, i.e. requiring stronger responses to inflation by the central bank, also generally applies within the 
parameter space in which determinacy occurs.   
 
IV.    Monetary Policy and Determinacy since the 1970s 
In this section, we revisit the issue of how monetary policy may have changed before and after the Volcker 
disinflation and whether any such changes may have moved the economy out of an indeterminate equilibrium in the 
pre-Volcker era in light of how determinacy results hinge on the trend inflation rate.  In section 4.1, we first estimate 
policy reaction functions for each time period.  We then feed the estimated parameters of the policy rules into our 
model to assess the determinacy implications of the differences in response coefficients across the two periods given 
different trend inflation rates in section 4.2.  Section 4.3 considers counterfactual experiments to study which 
changes in the policy rule have been most important and what further changes the Federal Reserve could pursue to 
strengthen the prospects of achieving determinacy.  In section 4.4, we allow for time-varying parameters in the 
policy rule from which we can extract a time-varying measure of trend inflation.  By combining our implied measure 
of trend inflation and the time-varying parameters of the policy rule with our model, we construct a time series of the 
probability of the US economy being in a state of determinacy since the late 1960s.  In section 4.5, we investigate the 
robustness of our baseline determinacy results to various price setting assumptions, the presence of habit formation, 
and alternative measurement of the output gap.  In section 4.6, we explore the correlation between volatility and 
trend inflation using cross-country data.  
Another way to explore the relationship between determinacy and policy would be to estimate the 
parameters of the Taylor rule jointly with the structural parameters of the model using full-information methods.  
This is the approach used by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006).  We chose not use this 
approach for several reasons.  First, our interest rate data and Greenbook forecasts are for each FOMC meeting, 
making the time frequency of the interest rate rule inconsistent with that of other observable macroeconomic 
variables and rendering simultaneous estimation particularly problematic.  Second, our estimates of the Fed’s 
reaction function are conditional on its historical forecasts, without requiring us to model how those forecasts are 
                                                            
25 When we compare utility for different levels of trend inflation, we focus only on the terms which depend on stabilization 
policies. We ignore the first order effects of trend inflation on welfare because they do not depend on stabilization policy.  18 
 
formed.  Third, while full-information approaches are commonly applied to determinate equilibria, estimation under 
indeterminacy requires selecting one out of many potential equilibrium outcomes.  While various criteria can be used 
for this selection, how best to proceed in this case remains a point of contention.  Nonetheless, the fact that our 
results point so strongly to indeterminacy in the pre-Volcker era provides support for recent work studying the 
estimation of DSGE models under indeterminacy.  Integrating positive trend inflation and monetary policy rules of 
the type considered in this paper, along with (potentially) limited information on the part of the central bank, into a 
DSGE model that can be estimated under determinacy and indeterminacy, while beyond the scope of this paper, 
would be useful in quantifying the relative importance of the elimination of indeterminacy in accounting for the 
Great Moderation.     
 
4.1  Estimation of the Federal Reserve’s Reaction Function 
Our baseline empirical specification for the Fed’s reaction function is a generalized Taylor rule in which we assume 
there is a single break in trend inflation as well as in the coefficients of the response function around the time of the 
Volcker disinflation.  Our baseline period-specific estimated Taylor rule is thus 
       1                                                                    , (6)   
where    is an error term.  This specification allows for interest smoothing of order two, as well as a response to 
inflation, output growth, and the output gap.  Allowing for responses to both the output gap and output growth is 
necessary because the two have different implications for determinacy with positive trend inflation.  The constant 
term c consists of the steady-state level of interest rate, plus the (constant) level of trend inflation, as well as the 
target levels of output growth and output gap.  To estimate equation (6), we follow Orphanides (2004) and use real-
time data for the estimation.  Specifically, we use the Greenbook forecasts of current and future macroeconomic 
variables prepared by staff members of the Fed a few days before each meeting of the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC).  The interest rate is the target federal funds rate set at each meeting, from Romer and Romer 
(2004).  The measure of the output gap is based on Greenbook forecasts, as compiled by Orphanides (2003, 2004).  
Data is available from 1969 to 2002 for each official meeting of the FOMC.  We consider two time samples: 1969-
1978 and 1983-2002.  Thus, we drop the period from 1979-1982 in which the Federal Reserve officially abandoned 
interest rate targeting in favor of targeting monetary aggregates.  Each t is a meeting of the FOMC.  From 1969-
1978, meetings were monthly, whereas from 1983 on, meetings were held every 6 weeks.  Note that this implies that 
the interest smoothing parameters in the Taylor rule are not directly comparable across the two time periods.
26 
                                                            
26 Cochrane (2007) argues that the central bank’s response to inflation will be unidentified in New Keynesian models when the 
Taylor rule includes a stochastic intercept term that corresponds to the natural rate of interest, i.e. the rate of interest that would 
hold in the frictionless economy. However, Sims (2008) shows that Cochrane’s argument holds only if the central bank is 
responding one-for-one to fluctuations in the natural rate of interest, an unlikely scenario due to the inherent difficulty in 
measuring the natural rate of interest, particularly in real time.    More generally, the Fed may be stabilizing inflation with off-
equilibrium path threats that may not be observed in equilibrium. However, in practice, periods of apparent indeterminacy in the 
policy rule have come when trend inflation is high. Thus it is highly unlikely that the Fed has effectively been using off-
equilibrium strategies over this period to stabilize inflation.  19 
 
Table 1 presents results of the least squares estimation of equation (6) over each time period for three cases: 
contemporaneous Taylor rule, forward-looking Taylor rule, and mixed.  In the case of the contemporaneous Taylor 
rule, we use the central bank’s forecast of values for the current quarter.  In the case of the forward-looking rule, we 
use the forecast of the average value over the next two quarters (but three quarter ahead forecast for the output gap).   
We find that interest rate decisions are best modeled (in terms of fitting the data) as a function of forecasts of future 
inflation but forecasts of contemporaneous output gap and output growth rate.
27  We will treat this as the baseline in 
subsequent sections.  In addition to point estimates, standard errors and selected statistics of fit, we report the sum of 
the interest smoothing parameters converted to a quarterly frequency.
28  We also include the probability value of the 
null that each of the parameters and the sum of interest smoothing parameters are the same in the two periods.   
We find that the Fed’s response to inflation in the pre-Volcker era satisfied the Taylor principle in forward-
looking specifications, but not under the contemporaneous Taylor rules.  Because the forward-looking specification 
is statistically preferred to a contemporaneous response to inflation, our evidence supports the argument of 
Orphanides (2004) that the Fed satisfied the Taylor principle in both periods, albeit weakly so.  Like Orphanides, we 
also find that while our estimates consistently point to a stronger response by the Fed to inflation in the latter period, 
we can only reject the null of no change in the response to inflation in the case of the mixed rule.  Thus, our 
estimates of the Fed’s response coefficients do not provide strong support for the claims of Taylor (1999) and 
Clarida et al (2000) that the failure to satisfy the basic Taylor principle before Volcker placed the US economy in an 
indeterminate region.  However, we do find that other response coefficients have changed in statistically significant 
ways.  First, interest rate decisions have become more persistent, in the sense that the sum of the autoregressive 
components is higher in the latter period than in the early period, and statistically significantly so in two out of three 
specifications.  Second, the Federal Reserve has changed how it responds to the real side of the economy.  Whereas 
the period before the Volcker disinflation was characterized by a strong long-run response to the output gap, but no 
statistically discernible response to output growth, the period since the Volcker disinflation displays much stronger 
long-run responses by the Fed to output growth than to the output gap.   
These results illustrate an important feature of the data: monetary policy has changed across time, despite the 
fact that one cannot consistently reject the null that the Fed’s response to inflation alone has not changed.  Thus were 
one to rely only on the basic Taylor principle as guidance for establishing determinacy, then one would reach the 
same conclusion as Orphanides (2004).  Yet the results of section 3 demonstrate that, once one allows for positive 
trend inflation, all of the components of the Fed’s response function play a role, along with the parameters of the 
model and the level of trend inflation.  Thus, the changes in the Fed’s response to output growth and interest 
                                                            
27 Specifically, we consider all possible variants of forward-looking and contemporaneous-looking for inflation, output gap, and 
output growth responses and use the AIC to select the best specification. In Appendix Table A3, we report AIC and BIC for 
different specifications. Note that the mixed rule used as our baseline calibration clearly dominates alternative specifications.  
28 Because there is no convenient formula for converting AR(2) parameters from monthly or 6-weekly frequency to quarterly, 
we use the following approach:  Given estimated AR(2) parameters, we simulate an AR(2) process at the original frequency, and 
then create a new (average) series at the quarterly frequency.  We then regress the quarterly series on two lags of itself over a 
sample of 50,000 periods and report the sum of the estimated parameters. 20 
 
smoothing, along with the stronger response to inflation, each have consequences for determinacy.  Interestingly, all 
of the policy changes made by the Fed since the Volcker disinflation –stronger response to output growth and 
inflation, more interest smoothing, and weaker response to output gap (albeit not statistically significantly so for the 
latter)– will tend to make determinacy more likely.   
Note that, as Orphanides (2001, 2004), Boivin (2006) and others argue, the key benefit of using Greenbook 
forecasts is to properly condition on the Federal Reserve’s real-time information set.  An additional appealing feature 
of using Greenbook forecasts is that one does not need to impose rational expectations on the central bank to 
estimate the reaction function.  However, to estimate a Taylor rule such as (6) by least squares requires that the 
orthogonality condition be satisfied, i.e. current forecasts be uncorrelated with the current monetary policy 
innovation.  We think there are several reasons why estimation by least squares is likely to be adequate.  First, as 
argued in Boivin (2006), if contemporaneous inflation, GDP growth and the output gap are unaffected by the current 
monetary policy innovation, as commonly assumed in the VAR literature, then estimation of equation (6) using 
contemporaneous values (j = 0) will be consistent.
29  The validity of the exogeneity assumption can then be assessed 
for rules with longer forecasting horizons by verifying whether coefficient estimates are sensitive to the forecasting 
horizon or more formally by using the Hausman test to directly assess whether the exogeneity condition is violated.  
We estimated a forward-looking Taylor rule using least squares and instrumental variables (IV) estimators, using 
current forecasts of lagged variables as instruments (since these are orthogonal to current monetary policy 
innovations) and found no evidence that favored IV estimation (Appendix Table A1).  Second, if Greenbook 
forecasts were made under assumptions about future policy actions that were systematically overturned, then these 
forecasts would be inferior to those made by agents who made better projections of future policy actions, such as 
professional forecasters.  Yet Romer and Romer (2000) document that Greenbook forecasts of inflation 
systematically outperform professional forecasters.  Third, we can augment the right-hand-side of equation (6) with a 
direct measure of monetary policy innovations from Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005), who identify monetary 
policy innovations by comparing Fed Funds Futures markets predictions of FOMC decisions with actual decisions.  
Adding this variable eliminates the omitted variable bias and hence least squares yields consistent estimates.  We 
found that estimates in this augmented specification are remarkably close to the specification without policy shocks 
identified via Fed Funds Futures (see results in Appendix Table A2).
30  We find similar results when we approximate 
the policy innovations as the difference between the fed funds rate assumed in the Greenbook forecasts and the Fed 
                                                            
29 Estimates of the effects of monetary policy shocks indicate that these shocks have little to no effect on macroeconomic 
variables at short time horizons.  This implies that the exogeneity assumption should also generally be valid when using 
forecasts of macroeconomic variables over the next one to two quarters, as emphasized in Romer and Romer (2004). 
30 The variation in the error term remaining after including policy shocks can be interpreted in a variety of ways (e.g., as 
measurement errors). We note, however, that the size of the remaining variation is very small and, hence, differences in 
interpretation are not likely to quantitatively affect our results.  21 
 
Funds rate chosen by the FOMC.
31,32  In summary, one may reasonably expect that the feedback from policy 
surprises to regressors in the Taylor rule is likely to lead to negligible distortions in the least squares estimates.  
 
4.2  Determinacy Before and After the Volcker Disinflation 
To assess the implications of our estimated response functions, we feed the estimated parameters from each Taylor 
rule into the model described and calibrated in section 2 to examine the determinacy implications of monetary policy 
over the two samples. We first consider whether the model yields a determinate rational expectations equilibrium 
(REE) given the estimated parameters of the Taylor rule for two trend inflation rates – 3% and 6% – designed to 
replicate average inflation rates in each of the two time periods.  In addition, we consider how determinacy varies 
over the statistical distribution of our parameter estimates.  For each type of Taylor rule and each sample period, we 
draw 10,000 times from the distribution of the estimated parameters and assess the fraction of draws that yield a 
determinate rational expectations equilibrium at 3% and 6% trend inflation. The results are presented in the bottom 
panel of Table 1.
33   
  First, we find that the pre-1979 response of the central bank implied an indeterminate REE given the average 
inflation rate of that time (6%).  This is a very robust implication of the Taylor rule estimates: both the 
contemporaneous and mixed Taylor rules yield zero percent of draws consistent with determinacy while the forward-
looking rule delivers a probability of determinacy of only 12%, despite a point estimate of 1.75 for the Fed’s 
response to expected inflation.  On the other hand, the post-1982 response is consistent with a determinate REE at 
the low average inflation rate of this period (3%).  Using our preferred specification, the mixed Taylor rule, more 
than 99% of the empirical distribution of parameters yields determinacy.  Thus, like Taylor (1999), Clarida et al 
(2000) and others, we find that monetary policy before Volcker led to indeterminacy in the 1970s, but that since 
1982 the Fed’s response has helped ensure determinacy.   
Our approach also allows us to assess the relative importance of the change in the Fed’s response function 
versus the change in trend inflation for altering the determinacy status of the economy.  For example, we note that 
had the Fed maintained its pre-1979 response function but lowered average inflation from 6% to 3% per year (via a 
change in the inflation target in the Taylor rule), the US economy would have remained in the indeterminacy region 
of the parameter space.  Thus, the Volcker disinflation, during which average inflation was brought down, would 
have been insufficient to guarantee determinacy without a change in the Fed’s response function as well.  Similarly, 
we also find that the Fed’s response to macroeconomic variables since 1982, while consistent with determinacy at 
                                                            
31 The series for the path of the Fed Funds rate assumed in the Greenbook forecasts are available from the Real-Time Data 
Research Center at the Federal Research Bank of Philadelphia.  
32 Unfortunately, the trading of Fed Funds Futures started in late 1980s and Fed Funds rate assumptions in Greenbook forecasts 
are available only after 1981 and thus we cannot investigate if these results extend prior to the 1980s. 
33 Before feeding estimated parameters into the model, we first convert the interest smoothing parameter into a quarterly 
frequency using the same approach as described in footnote 28 and divide the coefficient on the output gap by four, since the 
Taylor rules are estimated using annualized rates, the Taylor rule in the model is written in terms of quarterly rates, and the 
output gap is scale invariant.   22 
 
3% trend inflation, is only marginally consistent with determinacy at the inflation rate of the 1970s.  Specifically, 
while the estimated parameters of each specification yield a determinate REE at 6% trend inflation, only sixty 
percent of draws from the distribution of estimated parameters are consistent with determinacy at this inflation rate 
according to the mixed Taylor rule estimates.  Thus, the estimated parameters are near the edge of the parameter 
space consistent with a unique REE.  This implies that if the Fed in the 1970s had simply switched to the current 
policy rule without simultaneously engaging in the Volcker disinflation, it is quite possible that the US economy 
would have remained subject to self-fulfilling expectations-driven fluctuations.  The shift from indeterminacy to 
determinacy thus appears to have been due to two major policy changes: a change in the policy rule and a decline in 
the inflation target of the Federal Reserve during the Volcker disinflation.  Either one done individually would likely 
have been insufficient to move the economy from indeterminacy to determinacy. 
 
4.3 Counterfactual  Experiments 
The results of the previous section indicate that changes in monetary policy around the Volcker disinflation likely 
moved the US economy from a state of indeterminacy to one of determinacy, as originally argued by Taylor (1999) 
and Clarida et al (2000) and more recently reemphasized by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Boivin and Giannoni 
(2006).  While previous work has focused almost exclusively on the Fed’s response to inflation, we have shown that 
the Fed has also significantly changed its response to output growth as well as the degree of interest smoothing, but 
also that changes in trend inflation have played a crucial role. 
In this section, we perform counterfactual experiments designed to differentiate between the contributions of 
each policy change for determinacy.  To address the quantitative importance of each policy change, we consider the 
following set of experiments.  First, for each period’s policy rule, we draw from the empirical distribution of 
estimated parameters and calculate the fraction of draws that yield a determinate equilibrium at 3% and 6% trend 
inflation rates.  This replicates the exercise in Table 1 and serves as the baseline for this section’s analysis.  Then, we 
repeat the procedure but switch, in turn, the period-specific coefficients on inflation, interest smoothing, output 
growth and the output gap.
34  We continue to use baseline parameter values for the rest of the model.  
The results are presented in Table 2.  Consider first the effect of switching   .  For the pre-1979 period at 
6% trend inflation, this has no effect on determinacy, meaning that the fraction of draws from the empirical 
distribution of parameter estimates yielding a determinate REE is essentially unchanged at 0%.  This means that if 
the only policy change enacted by the Fed had been to raise its response to inflation to the post-1982 level, but 
leaving its other response coefficients and the trend inflation unchanged, the US economy would have remained in 
an indeterminate equilibrium.  Thus, while our findings support the argument of Clarida et al (2000) that the US 
                                                            
34 Specifically, we draw from each time period’s distribution of parameters, leaving the covariance matrix unchanged but 
altering the mean of the relevant parameter to match that of the other time sample. We assume a once and for all unexpected 
change in the parameters of the policy rule even though a more realistic description of policy changes would involve gradual 
transitions in parameter values (see Boivin 2006). 23 
 
moved from indeterminacy to determinacy during the Volcker disinflation, we emphasize not just the change in the 
Fed’s response to inflation, which by itself was not enough to shift the US economy out of the indeterminacy of the 
1970s, but rather that this policy change combined with the Volcker disinflation can account for much of the 
movement away from indeterminacy.  Specifically, we find that if the Fed had maintained its pre-Volcker policy rule 
but used the post-1982 inflation response, then this single policy switch combined with the Volcker disinflation 
would have raised the likelihood of determinacy to about two-thirds.   
We also consider the implication of switching the degree of interest smoothing across periods and the 
response to output growth, both of which are statistically different in the two time periods (see Table 1).  For interest 
smoothing, we find almost identical results as in the baseline case, indicating that the increased inertia of interest rate 
decisions since the Volcker disinflation cannot account for the switch in determinacy across periods.  Switching the 
response to output growth across the two periods has a more important effect. If we start with the estimated post-
1982 policy reaction function and switch     to its pre-1979 value, the fraction of draws yielding determinacy in the 
post-1982 period at 3% (6%) trend inflation would have been only 91% (26%) instead of 99% (62%) if the response 
to output growth had remained unchanged.  On the other hand, starting from the pre-1979 policy rule and raising     
the response to output growth to the post-1982 level has almost no effect on determinacy.  This indicates that the 
change in    , the response to output growth, complemented the other policy changes in terms of restoring 
determinacy, but could not, by itself, account for the reversal in determinacy around the time of the Volcker 
disinflation. 
Finally, we consider the effect of the decrease in the Fed’s response to the output gap, a policy difference 
strongly emphasized by Orphanides (2004), although we cannot reject the null of no change in the Fed’s response to 
the gap across time periods.  We find that if the post-1982 Fed had responded as strongly to the output gap as they 
did before Volcker, then the likelihood that the US economy would still be in the indeterminacy region would be 
somewhat higher, particularly at higher rates of inflation.  At 6% trend inflation, the fraction of draws yielding 
determinacy goes from 62% to 33%.  Thus, this result supports the emphasis placed by Orphanides (2004) on the 
lower response to the output gap by the Fed since the Volcker era, but for a different reason.  Orphanides stresses 
that if the output gap is mismeasured in real-time, then a strong response to the output gap, like that followed by the 
Fed in the 1970s, can be destabilizing.  Our interpretation is instead that even if the output gap is perfectly measured 
by the central bank, strong responses to the output gap can be destabilizing by raising the probability of 
indeterminacy.   
We can extend our analysis by investigating how the central bank can further minimize the likelihood of 
indeterminacy.  Thus, we consider determinacy prospects using each policy rule but imposing     0 .
35  In the post-
1982 period, eliminating the response to the output gap would raise the likelihood of determinacy significantly.  This 
                                                            
35 Here, we draw from each period’s distribution of parameters, then impose that the relevant coefficient be exactly zero for each 
draw. 24 
 
is most clearly visible at the 6% inflation rate, when eliminating the Fed’s response to the output gap would raise the 
probability of determinacy from 62% to 99%.  Thus, while the Fed has improved determinacy prospects somewhat 
by reducing its response to the output gap since the 1970s, a complete elimination of this response would be better 
yet. 
Importantly, this does not imply that the Federal Reserve is best served by not responding to the real side of 
the economy.  Consider the counterfactual of no response by the Fed to both the output gap and output growth in 
each time period.  In the post-1982 period, the prospects for determinacy are lower than in the case with just zero 
response to output gap, particularly at higher inflation rates.  For the latter, eliminating any response to the real side 
of the economy yields determinacy in less than 13% of draws, instead of the 99% when only the response to the 
output gap is eliminated.  Thus, the current strong response to output growth by the Federal Reserve is well-justified, 
and would play an important stabilizing role were the Fed to completely eliminate responding to the output gap. 
Furthermore, a positive response to the real side of the economy should not necessarily be interpreted as central 
bankers being ‘dovish’ on inflation.  
 
4.3  Time-Varying Trend Inflation 
Our baseline estimation approach assumes that trend inflation, as well as the central bank’s target for real GDP 
growth and the output gap, is constant within each time period.  In this section, we relax these assumptions and 
extract a measure of trend inflation which allows us to calculate a time series for the probability of determinacy for 
the U.S. economy.  Our approach follows Boivin (2006), who estimates a similar Taylor rule with time-varying 
coefficients.  We generalize the Taylor rule in equation (6) to: 
                 1     ,      ,     ,                    ,                           ,                  
     ,                       ,                        
where      is the target rate of inflation,    is the equilibrium real interest rate,          is the target rate of growth of real 
GDP, and     is the target level of the output gap.  We can rewrite this as 
                       1     ,      ,     ,             ,             ,             ,          ,                 (7) 
where the time-varying constant term is given by 
                                                  1    ,      ,    1     ,                 ,             ,     .           (8) 
To estimate the parameters of equation (7), we follow Boivin (2006) and assume that each of the parameters follows 
a random walk process and allow for two breaks in the volatility of shocks to the parameters: 1979 and 1982.  Using 
the Kalman filter and the corresponding smoother, we construct time series of the response coefficients of the Taylor 
rule and of the time-varying constant.   
The results for the estimated parameters, including the time-varying constant, are presented in Figure 3, 
along with one standard deviation confidence intervals.  The results broadly confirm those in the baseline estimation: 
namely, there was a sharp increase in the Fed’s response to inflation and output growth around the time of the 25 
 
Volcker disinflation, as well as a rise in the degree of interest smoothing, and there was little change in the response 
to the output gap once one allows for time-varying parameters.  In addition, the time-varying parameters allow us to 
paint a more nuanced picture of monetary policy in the pre-Volcker era.  Namely, the estimated coefficients in 1969 
are remarkably similar to those for the 1990s with strong responses to output growth and inflation, but there was a 
discernible change in the Fed’s response function in the early 1970s that was reversed during the Volcker 
disinflation. 
  To extract a measure of trend inflation from the time-varying constant, we make additional assumptions 
about the equilibrium real interest rate and the Fed’s targets for real GDP growth and the output gap.  We follow 
Kozicki and Tinsley (2009) and approximate the equilibrium real interest rate, the target growth rate of real GDP, 
and the target output gap by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter over each time period to extract a trend measure of 
each series, which we then feed into equation (8), along with estimates of time-varying parameters, to extract our 
measure of trend inflation.  The bottom right panel of Figure 3 presents our (smoothed) estimate of the latter, along 
with one standard deviation confidence intervals.  This measure of time-varying trend inflation paints a similar 
picture of changes in monetary policy as the response coefficients.  Namely, at the start of the sample, the Fed’s 
target rate of inflation was low, around 3%, and rose slightly over the early 1970’s.  Starting around 1975, we see a 
substantial increase in the Fed’s target inflation, which peaks at approximately 8% in 1978.  Thus, the data point to 
increasing accommodation of inflationary pressures by the Federal Reserve in the mid to late 1970s.  The latter is 
reversed during the Volcker disinflation, after which target inflation is progressively reduced to 2% by the early 
2000’s.  This behavior of trend inflation is remarkably consistent with the estimates of Cogley, Primiceri, and 
Sargent (2008), and Ireland (2007) despite the differences in approaches.   
  Given the estimated time series of the Fed’s response coefficients and our measure of trend inflation, we can 
construct a time series of the probability of determinacy for the U.S. economy given the estimated distribution of 
parameters.  As is section 4.2, we do this by feeding the estimated parameters into our baseline model, and generate a 
probability of determinacy by repetitively drawing from the distribution of parameters.  Unlike our baseline 
estimates however, we can now use this procedure for each period to generate a time-varying measure of the 
probability of determinacy.  We do this under three alternative assumptions.  The first is to allow for time-varying 
response coefficients but impose a constant rate of 3% trend inflation.  The second is identical except that we impose 
a constant rate of 6% trend inflation.  The third approach again uses time-varying response coefficients but also 
makes use of our time-varying estimate of trend inflation.
36   
  The results are presented in Figure 4.  Looking first at the estimates using time-varying trend inflation, the 
results from our baseline estimation are re-confirmed: the U.S. economy was very likely in a state of indeterminacy 
                                                            
36 To be consistent with the other cases of constant trend inflation, we do not take into account the uncertainty associated with 
the estimated time-varying trend inflation when computing the probability of determinacy each period.  Doing so leads to 
slightly higher (lower) estimates of the probability of determinacy in the late 1970s (mid to late 1980’s) because the standard 
errors associated with the estimated levels of trend inflation are relatively large.  However, this does not affect, qualitatively, the 
pattern observed in Figure 4. 26 
 
before the Volcker disinflation but not thereafter.  Again, the use of time-varying parameters provides a more 
detailed perspective on the pre-Volcker era.  At the start of our sample period, the probability of determinacy was 
close to one, reflecting the low estimate of trend inflation at the time as well as the strong responses to inflation and 
output growth.  However, we can observe a rapid deterioration of stabilization properties of monetary policy in the 
early 1970s, such that by 1975 the probability of the U.S. economy being in a state of determinacy was less than ten 
percent.  This was not reversed until the Volcker disinflation, since which the probability of determinacy has 
consistently exceeded eighty percent.  This finding is consistent with the view laid out in Romer and Romer (2002) 
emphasizing that good policy prevailed during Martin’s chairmanship of the Fed (which ended in 1970) and returned 
with Volcker’s ascent.   
  The results with time-varying parameters also confirm the key role played by changes in the level of trend 
inflation in accounting for the apparent transition from determinacy to indeterminacy in the early 1970s and then 
back to determinacy during the Volcker disinflation.  Consider the first transition in the early 1970s.  Our estimates 
imply that if the Fed had only changed its response coefficients but held the target rate of inflation constant at 3%, 
the economy would have been right at the edge of the determinacy-indeterminacy region, implying that the change in 
trend inflation accounts for approximately half of the switch from determinacy to indeterminacy over this time 
period.  During the Volcker disinflation, the results are similar: had the Fed only changed its response coefficients 
but left its target inflation in the neighborhood of six percent, the probability of indeterminacy would still have been 
around fifty percent by the mid-1990s rather than ten percent.  Thus, these results reinforce the key point that one 
cannot address determinacy issues only by focusing on the response coefficients of the central bank, instead we need 
to consider the interaction of the central bank’s response coefficients with trend inflation.  
 
4.5 Robustness  Analysis 
The fact that higher trend inflation raises the likelihood of indeterminacy reflects the increased importance of 
forward-looking behavior in firms’ price setting decisions.  Specifically, when firms reset prices in the Calvo model, 
the weight placed on future profits depends strongly on how likely a firm is to not have altered its price by that 
period.  Thus, greater price stickiness will naturally increase the sensitivity of reset prices to expectations of future 
macroeconomic variables.  As a result, one would expect indeterminacy to become increasingly difficult to eliminate 
as the degree of price rigidity rises.   
To see whether this is indeed the case, we consider two alternative degrees of price stickiness.  First, we 
follow Bils and Klenow (2004) who find that firms update prices every 4 to 5 months on average which corresponds 
to  =0.40 in our model.  Second, we follow Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) who find much longer durations of price 
spells ranging between 8 and 11 months on average.  In this case, we set  =0.70.  We reproduce the determinacy 
results of section 4.2 in Table 3 using the mixed Taylor rule for each time period.  Under the Bils and Klenow case, 
we recover our baseline results of indeterminacy in the 1970s but determinacy after the Volcker disinflation.   27 
 
However, we can see that determinacy is more easily sustained under lower levels of price rigidity by the fact that 
the fraction of the empirical distribution yielding determinacy is consistently higher than in the baseline case.  In 
addition, using this lower rate of price-stickiness implies that determinacy would have been achieved solely through 
the change in the Fed’s response to macroeconomic variables.  Using the degree of price stickiness from Nakamura 
and Steinsson moves all of the quantitative results in the opposite direction.  For the pre-Volcker era, the results are 
qualitatively similar to our baseline findings, with indeterminacy occurring consistently at both inflation rates.   
However, with this higher degree of price stickiness, we now find that the current policy rule is likely inconsistent 
with determinacy: even at 3% inflation, less than 50% of the empirical distribution of Taylor rule estimates yields a 
determinate REE equilibrium.   
Clearly, the degree of price stickiness plays an important role in determinacy conditions.  However, the 
importance of this variable is likely overestimated under Calvo pricing.  This setup forces firms to place some weight 
on possible future outcomes in which their relative price would be so unprofitable that “real world” firms would 
likely choose to pay a menu cost and reset their price.
37  An alternative approach to Calvo pricing is the staggered 
contracts approach of Taylor (1977) in which firms set prices for a pre-determined duration of time.  This pricing 
assumption can loosely be thought of as a lower bound on forward-looking behavior (conditional on price durations) 
since it imposes zero weight on expected profits beyond those of the contract length in the firm’s reset price 
optimization.  We replicate our results using staggered pricing with firms setting prices for three quarters and display 
the results in Table 3.  For the pre-Volcker era, the results again largely point to indeterminacy at high levels of 
inflation.  However, the post-1982 policy rule is now consistent with determinacy at both 3% and 6% inflation rates.  
In fact, the results using staggered price setting with duration of 9 months are very close to those using Calvo price 
setting with average price duration of 5 months.  This reflects the shortened time horizon of price-setting firms with 
staggered contracts and the concurrent decrease in the importance of expectations of future outcomes relative to the 
Calvo case.  We interpret Taylor pricing as setting a lower bound on determinacy issues (conditional on average 
price durations) and Calvo pricing an upper bound.  Despite the sensitivity of determinacy results to these variations, 
what seems clear is that the U.S. economy was in an indeterminate region of the parameter space in the pre-Volcker 
era given the high average inflation of that time, but moved into the determinacy region after 1982.  The relative 
importance of the decrease in trend inflation versus the changes in the Fed’s response to macroeconomic conditions, 
on the other hand, is sensitive to the price-setting model and average price durations used.  In the absence of 
definitive evidence favoring one modeling approach over the other along with clearer results on how sticky prices 
actually are in the data, we are unable to decisively measure the relative importance of these two monetary policy 
changes. 
A closely related issue is how to model price adjustment frictions faced by firms.  The notion of menu costs 
naturally gives rise to models in which firms change prices infrequently while the notion that firms face 
                                                            
37 Another way to see this limitation of the Calvo model is to note that using Nakamura and Steinsson rates of price-setting, the 
Calvo model breaks down (i.e. γ2 ≥ 1) at an inflation rate of 6.1%. 28 
 
informational frictions gives rise to models in which firms set pricing plans.  A common approach to reconciling 
these notions is to model firms as facing sticky prices with indexation, i.e. allowing non-reoptimizing firms to 
automatically adjust their prices by some fraction of either last period’s inflation or the trend inflation rate, thereby 
increasing the persistence of the inflation process (see Yun (1996) and Christiano et al (2005)).  Our baseline model 
does not include this feature for two reasons.  First, the workhorse New Keynesian model is based only on price 
stickiness, making this the most natural benchmark (Clarida et al (1999) and Woodford (2003)).  Second, any price 
indexation implies that firms are constantly changing prices, a feature strongly at odds with the empirical findings of 
Bils and Klenow (2004) and more recently Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), among many others.  Third, while 
indexation is often included to replicate the apparent role for lagged inflation in empirical estimates of the NKPC 
(see Clarida et al 1999), Cogley and Sbordone (2008) show that once one controls for trend inflation, estimates of the 
NKPC reject the presence of indexation in price setting decisions.  Nonetheless, because this feature is so prevalent 
in the literature, we briefly discuss how it affects our results. 
Ascari and Ropele (2007) have shown that allowing for indexation diminishes the determinacy issues that 
arise with positive trend inflation.  The reason is that indexation decreases the devaluation of firms’ reset prices that 
comes from positive trend inflation.  This tends to offset the need for more forward-looking behavior induced by 
positive trend inflation.  In the special case of full indexation—firms raise their price fully with past inflation or the 
level of trend inflation—determinacy in the model becomes completely insensitive to trend inflation.  We follow 
Yun (1996) and consider the case in which firms index their prices to trend inflation by some fraction ω, where 
0   1 .   One can readily show that the log-linearized equation for the relative reset price is unchanged but for 
the new coefficients: 
  
      Π          
 
  
      Π            . 
and the relationship between the reset price and inflation is now given by 
     
1   Π            
 Π                 . 
In the special case of full-indexation (ω = 1), then   
      
  and the dynamics collapse to those of the standard New 
Keynesian model based on zero-trend-inflation approximations.
38 
  We replicate our baseline empirical results on determinacy prospects based on our mixed Taylor rule 
estimates for each time period and for different levels of price indexation in Figure 5.
39  Figure 5 makes clear that as 
indexation rises, the fraction of the empirical distribution of Taylor rule estimates consistent with determinacy also 
                                                            
38 Allowing for indexation to past inflation changes the reset price equation by also introducing lagged inflation.  However, the 
results for determinacy are very similar to those with indexation to trend inflation. 
39 We continue to assume λ=0.55, although another drawback of introducing indexation into a model is that it is unclear how to 
link price stickiness from the micro data to price setting models with indexation in which firms are continuously changing 
prices.   29 
 
rises.  Note that it takes fairly high levels of indexation to change our results substantially.  For example, for the 
probability of determinacy to exceed 50% in the pre-1979 era at 6% inflation requires price indexation of more than 
0.9.  Thus, the result that the US economy was likely in an indeterminacy region pre-Volcker but not thereafter is 
robust to substantial levels of price indexation.  However, the importance of taking into account positive trend 
inflation to reach this conclusion is also clearly illustrated in Figure 5.  This can be seen by examining the results 
with full price indexation (ω = 1), in which case the supply-side of the model is observationally equivalent to the 
NKPC with zero trend inflation.
40  Determinacy is then driven almost exclusively by the Fed’s response to inflation, 
yielding a probability of determinacy of more than 99% in the post-1982 era and approximately 55% in the pre-1979 
era.  The latter number reflects the fact that the point estimate of the Fed’s long-run response to inflation is barely 
above one, so slightly more than half the draws from the empirical distribution will satisfy the Taylor principle and 
generate determinacy. 
The basic New Keynesian model tends to have weak internal propagation mechanisms. A popular 
modification to the model is to introduce habit formation in consumption which helps to match persistence of output 
observed in the data (see e.g. Fuhrer (2000)).  To consider the implications of habit formation for our results, we 
replace the consumer’s objective function with the objective function as in Proposition 1. While estimated degrees of 
habit formation vary widely, we choose a value from the upper end of the estimated spectrum, h = 0.9, as a 
robustness check.  We replicate the determinacy results from the previous section using baseline parameters and 
habit formation in Table 3.  The results are almost identical to our baseline case. 
  An important parameter in New Keynesian models is the elasticity of substitution θ which affects the degree 
of strategic complementarity in price setting   As a robustness check, we consider the much lower value of θ=6, 
which implies markups of 20% and which is consistent with recent estimates of θ in DSGE models.  With a lower 
elasticity of substitution, strategic complementarity in price setting is substantially reduced so that firms focus less 
on the pricing behavior of other firms and hence on trend inflation.  Correspondingly, a lower θ tends to offset some 
of the effects of positive trend inflation on determinacy.  As shown in Table 3, this does not alter our baseline result 
of indeterminacy in the 1970s switching to determinacy in the 1980s, but it does reduce the quantitative importance 
of trend inflation in accounting for the results, which is similar to our findings for reduced price stickiness as in Bils 
and Klenow (2004).  We obtain similar results when we reduce the degree of strategic complementarity by replacing 
the assumption of firm-specific labor with the assumption of homogeneous, freely mobile labor.
41 However, with 
lower levels of strategic complementarity, one needs longer durations of price spells to match the persistence of 
macroeconomic data. We find that combinations of higher price stickiness (such as Nakamura and Steinsson values) 
with lower estimates of the elasticity of substitution yield essentially the same results as our baseline. 
                                                            
40 This is why, for each time period, the 3% and 6% lines converge to the same value when ω = 1. 
41 Firm-specific labor, as shown in Woodford (2003), helps generate significant strategic complementarity in price setting, a 
necessary feature for sticky-price models to match the persistence of macroeconomic variables. 30 
 
  We also experimented with a higher discount factor (β=0.995) than our baseline assumption, to generate a 
steady-state level of the real interest rate of 2.5% that closely matches the average real interest rate over our sample 
period.  As illustrated in Table 3, this had little effect on our results.  Likewise, we find that the change in the 
forecast horizon for inflation from two quarters ahead to four quarters ahead has little effect on our results.
42  
Finally, we examine how potential differences in the PLT response for pre-1979 and post-1982 periods 
affect determinacy results.  Following Gorodnichenko and Shapiro (2007), we introduce an element of (partial) price 
level targeting into the Taylor rule and after estimating this modified rule, we compute the fraction of cases with a 
determinate equilibrium.  Because PLT and AR(2) interest rate smoothing have very similar reduced form estimates, 
our determinacy results survive this robustness check as well.  
 
4.6   International Aspect of the Great Moderation 
The decline in volatility of economic activity has been observed not only in the US but also in many other countries.  
However, the timing of the decline varies across countries thus suggesting the Great Moderation was probably not 
driven by global shocks. We argue that the Great Moderation in the US is consistent with improvements in monetary 
policy which includes both changes in the policy reaction function and significant decreases in the level of inflation. 
One might expect that similar forces could account for the declining GDP volatility in other countries as well. Since 
we do not have real time data and forecasts for other countries, we can examine only whether macroeconomic 
volatility fell when countries moved to lower trend inflation rates. 
Following Blanchard and Simon (2001), we compute    , the volatility of real GDP growth rates       
log       /    ,       100 for country i and time t, over    to    2 0  quarters. We use the same window to 
compute the average inflation rate      , which approximates the trend inflation rate and where the inflation rate in 
period t for country i is      l o g             /    ,       400.
43 The mean values for     and        are 0.95 and 5.35 
respectively. Figure 6 plots the time series of     and        for a set of developed countries.   
We observe strong comovement in trend inflation and volatility with a few exceptions. Periods of low trend 
inflation tend to coincide with period of low macroeconomic volatility. The unconditional correlation between       
and     is high at 0.49 when we use cross-country data and stunning at 0.81 when we use US data only. To formally 
assess the strength of the comovement, we estimate the following specification: 
                            , (9) 
where    and    are country and period fixed effects and     is the error term. Note that in the specification with time 
specific effects we control for global shocks (e.g., changes in commodity prices) for each quarter in our data. We 
also consider a specification in which time fixed effects are replaced with polynomials in time. Estimates of   (Table 
4) suggest an economically and statistically significant relationship between trend inflation and volatility. In 
                                                            
42 Appendix Table A4 provides additional robustness checks for the horizon of inflation forecast in the Taylor rule.  
43 Real GDP growth rates and inflation rates are seasonally adjusted. The sources of the data are Quarterly National Accounts 
from the OECD and International Financial Statistics from the IMF.  31 
 
particular, a one-standard-deviation increase in inflation, which is equal to 4.19, is associated with 0.13 to 0.2 
increase in volatility    , which approximately corresponds to a 14-22% increase in volatility relative to the mean 
volatility.   
Given our arguments for the USA, we interpret these findings as suggestive evidence that the Great 
Moderation across counties was in part determined by reductions in trend inflation. These lower levels of trend 
inflation contributed to making monetary policy more effective at stabilizing economic activity. In a sense, one may 
associate the end of the Great Inflation with the beginning of the Great Moderation.
44 Cross-country evidence also 
suggests that the cost of trend inflation may have been understated in previous studies since the link between positive 
trend inflation and macroeconomic volatility has not been explored.  
    
V.     Conclusion 
This paper sheds new light on the sources of the significant decrease in macroeconomic volatility since the early 
1980s commonly referred to as the Great Moderation.  First, we confirm the original insight of Clarida et al (2000) 
that the US economy moved from the indeterminacy region in the 1970s to determinacy since the early 1980s 
because of changes in monetary policy.  This point of view has been challenged in a series of papers by Orphanides 
(2001,2002,2004) arguing that the Fed, in fact, satisfied the Taylor principle in both periods and that the US 
economy could therefore not have been in an indeterminate region in the 1970s.  Instead, Orphanides emphasized the 
Fed’s decreased response to the (mismeasured) output gap since Volcker’s accession as chairman of the Fed as a 
primary source of economic stabilization.  Building on recent work by Ascari and Ropele (2007), Kiley (2007) and 
Hornstein and Wolman (2005) showing that the Taylor principle does not guarantee determinacy when trend 
inflation is positive, we argue that while the Fed may indeed have satisfied the Taylor principle in the pre-Volcker 
era, the US economy was still subject to sunspot fluctuations in the 1970s given the high average rate of inflation 
over this time period, as well as the Fed’s response to both inflation and the real side of the economy.   
Our basic findings thus provide additional support for the well-known view that monetary policy changes 
have likely played an important element in accounting for the Great Moderation.  However, the specific policy 
changes that we emphasize differ from the consensus monetary policy interpretation.  One novel finding is that the 
Volcker disinflation very likely played a key role in restoring macroeconomic stability through its effect on the level 
of trend inflation.  In a similar vein, we find that decreased levels of inflation were associated with decreased 
macroeconomic volatility in other countries.  In addition, we show using time-varying estimates of trend inflation 
that the increase in the Fed’s target rate of inflation in the early 1970s contributed to the US economy moving into 
the indeterminacy region over this time period.  Thus, our results strongly support the emphasis placed by some 
recent work on studying the determinants of trend inflation, such as Primiceri (2006), Cogley et al (2008), and 
                                                            
44 Although some researchers link the increased trend inflation with indeterminacy, we are agnostic about sources of changes in 
the trend inflation which could have started also due to mis-measurement of potential output or using the wrong model for 
policy.  We take the changes in trend inflation as exogenous in our analyses.  32 
 
Ireland (2007), and complement the finding of Cogley and Sbordone (2008) that accounting for trend inflation has 
important implications for estimates of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve.  Furthermore, we show that with positive 
trend inflation policymakers should respond more aggressively to inflation to maintain a stable level of welfare even 
when the economy stays inside the determinacy region. 
In addition, while most research has emphasized the central bank’s response to inflation as the key 
determinant for determinacy, our results move the Fed’s response to the real side of the economy to center stage, 
particularly when trend inflation is relatively high.  In such a setting, responding to the output gap, even if perfectly 
measured, can be destabilizing, while responding to output growth is stabilizing.  As a result, the substantial increase 
in the Federal Reserve’s response to output growth since the Volcker disinflation has played a nonnegligible role in 
restoring determinacy for the US economy.  Thus, contrary to previous work, we find little evidence that the Fed is 
less sensitive to the real side of the economy; rather it has altered the primary measure of the real side of the 
economy to which it responds.  Our counterfactuals imply that the Fed could go much further and eliminate any 
response to the output gap, while maintaining a strong response to output growth, to further improve determinacy 
prospects even at high (for the US) trend inflation rates. Our theoretical and empirical results lead to policy 
prescriptions which differ qualitatively and quantitatively from views commonly held in academic and policy circles.   
We believe that the issues raised in the present paper deserve further investigation as well as careful attention from 
policymakers because there remains a non-negligible (albeit smaller than before) chance that an indeterminacy-
driven period of high economic volatility could still occur.   
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Figure 1: Determinacy in a New Keynesian Model with Calvo Pricing for Positive Trend Inflation Rates 
Panel A: Basic Taylor Rules 
 
Panel B: Responding to Output Gap 
 
(continued on next page) 
  

































































Panel C: Responding to Output Growth 
 
Panel D: Interest Smoothing 
 
Notes: Trend inflation rate  (percent per year) is on the horizontal axis.  The response to inflation in the Taylor rule is 
on the vertical axis.  The basic Taylor rule has zero response to output gap and output growth rate as well as no 
interest rate smoothing. Forward rules respond to expected values of macroeconomic variables (j = 1) while the 
contemporaneous rules respond to current values of macroeconomic variables (j = 0).  The model and calibration of 
parameters are described in the text. Panel A: The basic Taylor rule has zero response to output gap and output 
growth rate as well as no interest rate smoothing, i.e.               where    is the inflation rate. Panel B: The 
simulated policy rule is                          where    is output gap. Panel C: The simulated policy rule is 
                          where      is the growth rate of output. Panel D:                1             
where ρ is the degree of interest smoothing.  For   1 , the simulated Taylor rule is                     . 
  

































































Figure 2:  The Effects of Trend Inflation within the Determinacy Region 
 
Notes: The figure plots the central bank’s minimal response to inflation required to maintain a given level of utility 
for a given level of trend inflation relative to the minimal response to inflation necessary to maintain this level of 
utility for zero trend inflation. The policy rule is          . The utility level is computed using the second order 
approximation to consumer utility with habit formation in consumption. Habit is governed by the parameter h. See 
text for further details.  
 
 
















































Figure 3: Time-Varying Parameter Estimates of the Taylor Rule 
 
Notes:  The figure presents time-varying parameter estimates of the Taylor rule, equation (7) in the text, under the assumption that parameters follow random walks.  
We allow for two breaks in volatility of the shocks to parameters: 1979 and 1982.  Dashed lines indicate one standard deviation confidence intervals.  Trend inflation 
is extracted from the time-varying constant as explained in section 4.4.  Point estimates and confidence intervals are smoothed (moving average over five FOMC 
meetings) for expositional purposes.  The sum of autoregressive coefficients in the Taylor rule is adjusted to quarterly frequency because pre-1979 and post-1982 
periods have different frequency of FOMC meetings.   


















































Figure 4: Probability of Determinacy using Time-Varying Response Function by the Federal Reserve 
 
Notes: The figure presents the probability of determinacy implied by the distribution of time-varying parameters estimated in 
section 4.4 when combined with the baseline model of section 2 under various assumptions about trend inflation.  The dashed 
(dotted) black line assumes a constant rate of trend inflation of 3% (6%), while the solid blue line uses the time-varying measure 
of trend inflation estimated in section 4.4.  The estimates are smoothed (moving average over five FOMC meetings) for 












































Constant 3% Trend Inflation
Constant 6% Trend Inflation
Time-Varying Trend Inflation40 
 
Figure 5: Effect of Price Indexation on Determinacy Results 
 
Notes:  The figure plots the fraction of draws from the empirical distribution of coefficient estimates of the mixed 
Taylor rules from Table 1 in both time periods under alternative assumptions about trend inflation (3% or 6%) and 
































































Pre-1979 policy rule at 3 percent trend inflation
Pre-1979 policy rule at 6 percent trend inflation
Post-1982 policy rule at 3 percent trend inflation
Post-1982 policy rule at 6 percent trend inflation41 
 
Figure 6: Trend inflation and volatility of real GDP growth rates across countries.  
 
Notes: The blue dashed line is average annualized CPI inflation over current and past 20 quarters. The red solid line is the volatility of real GDP growth over current 
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Table 1: Reduced Form Estimates of Taylor Rule 
  
  
Contemporaneous Taylor Rule   Forward-Looking Taylor Rule   Mixed Taylor Rule 
pre 
1979     post 




   pre 1979  post 




   pre 





  ,   0.79 1.58  0.17 
(0.27) (0.51) 
  ,   1.75 2.53  0.53  1.04 2.20  0.03 
(1.16) (0.60)  (0.31) (0.40) 
  ,    0.04 2.21  0.01  0.00 1.56  0.00 
(0.13) (0.82)  (0.12) (0.39) 
  ,    0.32 2.18  0.10 
(0.80) (0.82) 
  ,   0.48 0.44  0.84  0.52 0.43  0.42 
(0.12) (0.16)  (0.13) (0.12) 
  ,   1.03 0.59  0.54 
(0.70) (0.22) 
    1.39 1.12  1.34 1.28  1.34 1.05 
(0.09) (0.10)  (0.09) (0.09)  (0.10) (0.10) 
    -0.49 -0.18  -0.39 -0.34  -0.44 -0.13 
(0.10) (0.10)  (0.09) (0.09)  (0.10) (0.10) 
  
      
   0.63 0.90  0.00  0.82 0.87  0.34  0.66 0.86  0.02 
    (0.10)     (0.05)           (0.11)     (0.06)          (0.09)     (0.04)      
R
2 0.967  0.984  0.966  0.982  0.966  0.985 
s.e.e. 0.403  0.287  0.409  0.308  0.408  0.280 
AIC 0.737  0.808  0.722 
SIC 0.893  0.965  0.878 
p-val BG LM Test  0.465  0.583  0.910 
Determinacy 
3% inflation  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Fraction at 3%  0.120 0.712  0.480 0.977  0.075 0.994 
6% inflation  No No  No Yes  No Yes 
Fraction at 6%  0.000 0.123  0.119 0.494  0.0  0.622 
Notes: The top panel reports NLS estimates of the Taylor rule.  Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.  p-value equality of response is the p-value of the null that the long-run responses are the same across the two 
periods. f,* corresponds to the average forecast of the next 2 quarters in Taylor rule estimated in equation (6).  t,* 
corresponds to j = 0 in Taylor rule estimated in equation (6).   
      
  is sum of autoregressive coefficients adjusted to 
quarterly frequency because pre-1979 and post-1982 periods have different frequency of FOMC meetings.  AIC (SIC) is 
Akaike (Schwartz) Information Criterion for joint regression.  p-val BG LM Test is the p-value for the Breusch-Godfrey 
Serial Correlation LM Test (using one lag).  The bottom panel reports whether the estimated coefficients are consistent 
with a unique REE for trend inflation rates of 3% and 6%.  ‘Yes’/’No’ shows whether there is a determinate rational 
expectations equilibrium when the policy reaction function rule is evaluated at point estimates of the Taylor rule.   
Fraction at x% is the fraction of draws from the distribution of estimated parameters which yield a unique REE at the 
specified inflation rate.  10,000 draws were used to compute the fraction of cases with indeterminate solutions. For each 
draw, parameters of a Taylor rule are taken from the joint asymptotically normal distribution based on least squares 
estimates of Taylor rules. 
  43 
 
Table 2: Counterfactual Experiments 
      Taylor rule parameters  Trend inflation 
       gy x 1  2  3%  6% 
Pre-1979 period 
Baseline Taylor Rule Estimates  1.043  -0.002  0.525  1.340  -0.436  7.5%  0.0% 
Switch Inflation Response   2.201  -0.002 0.525 1.340 -0.436  67.4%  0.3% 
Switch Interest Smoothing Parameters  1.043  -0.002  0.525  1.052 -0.129  8.8% 0.0% 
Switch Output Growth Response  1.043  1.561  0.525 1.340 -0.436  9.6%  0.0% 
Switch Output Gap Response  1.043  -0.002  0.428  1.340 -0.436  9.5%  0.1% 
Zero Output Gap Response  1.043  -0.002  0  1.340 -0.436  3.8%  0.0% 
Zero Output Gap and Output Growth Response 1.043  0 0  1.340 -0.436  2.6%  0.1% 
Post-1982 period 
Baseline Taylor Rule Estimates  2.201  1.561  0.428  1.052  -0.129  99.4%  62.2% 
Switch Inflation Response   1.043  1.561 0.428  1.052 -0.129  22.0%  0.1% 
Switch Interest Smoothing Parameters  2.201  1.561  0.428  1.340 -0.436  99.3% 61.9% 
Switch Output Growth Response  2.201  -0.002  0.428 1.052 -0.129  91.3%  26.4% 
Switch Output Gap Response  2.201  1.561  0.525  1.052 -0.129  98.8% 33.3% 
Zero Output Gap Response  2.201  1.561  0  1.052 -0.129  99.8% 98.7% 
   Zero Output Gap and Output Growth Response 2.201  0 0  1.052 -0.129      95.4% 12.7% 
 
Notes: This table lists determinacy results for the 1969-1978 period and the 1983-2002 period for trend 
inflation rates of 3% and 6%.  Baseline Taylor Rule Estimates refers to the case in which the estimated 
parameters of the mixed Taylor rule from Table 1 are plugged into the model.  Switching means using the 
coefficient from the other period's estimated rule and keeping the other parameters of the rule unchanged.  
Parameter values in bold show the coefficient for which the value is modified.  10,000 draws were used to 
compute the fraction of cases with determinate solutions. For each draw, parameters of a Taylor rule are taken 




Table 3: Robustness of Determinacy Results 

















Bils and Klenow (2004) Case (change prices every 5 months) 
   3% inflation  No 16.9%  Yes 99.5% 
   6% inflation  No 0.0%  Yes  93.3% 
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) Case (change prices every 10 months) 
   3% inflation  No 0.0%  No  42.0% 
   6% inflation  No 0.0%  No 0.1% 
Taylor Staggered Price Setting (duration of 9 months) 
   3% inflation  No 30.9%  Yes 99.7% 
   6% inflation  No 7.1%  Yes  99.5% 
Baseline with habit formation (h = 0.9) 
   3% inflation  No 9.9%  Yes  99.6% 
   6% inflation  No 0.0%  Yes  62.5% 
Lower elasticity of substitution θ = 6  
   3% inflation  No 37.3%  Yes 99.9% 
   6% inflation  No 10.1%  Yes 99.6% 
Lower elasticity of substitution θ = 6 and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) Case 
   3% inflation  No 8.0%  Yes  99.4% 
   6% inflation  No 0.0%  Yes  60.2% 
Higher discount factor (beta = 0.995) 
   3% inflation  No 5.3%  Yes  99.2% 
   6% inflation  No 0.0%  Yes  56.5% 
Homogenous, freely mobile labor 
   3% inflation  No 48.1%  Yes 99.8% 
   6% inflation  No 39.3%  Yes 99.8% 
Forecast for average inflation over next four quarters in the Taylor rule
   3% inflation  No 3.4%  Yes  99.1% 
   6% inflation  No 0.0%  Yes  61.9% 
Taylor rules with price level targeting 
   3% inflation  No 21.5%  Yes 93.5% 
   6% inflation  No 6.6%  No  72.3% 
                 
Notes: The table presents robustness results of determinacy from Table 2.  ‘Yes’/’No’ shows whether there 
is a determinate rational expectations equilibrium when the policy reaction function is evaluated at point 
estimates of the Taylor rule. 10,000 draws were used to compute the fraction of cases with determinate 
solutions. For each draw, parameters of a Taylor rule are taken from the joint asymptotically normal 
distribution based on least squares estimates of Taylor rules. 
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Table 4. Macroeconomic volatility and trend inflation across countries 
 
  Dependent variable: Volatility of real GDP 
growth rate     
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Trend inflation        0.052*** 0.056*** 0.029** 0.031*** 
 (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.012)  (0.008) 
Country fixed effect  N  Y  Y  Y 
Time fixed effect  N  N  Y  N 
Time polynomials  N  N  N  Y 
Observations 2,886  2,886  2,886  2,886 
R-squared 0.261  0.666  0.764  0.745 
 
Notes: The table reports estimates for equation (9). Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to 
arbitrary serial correlation of the error term. Standard errors are clustered by country to allow for arbitrary 
serial correlation. *,**,*** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
Time polynomials include linear and quadratic time trends.  
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Appendix Figure A1: Determinacy in a New Keynesian Model with Taylor Staggered Pricing for Positive SS Inflation 
Rates:  
Panel A: Basic Taylor Rules 
 
Panel B: Responding to Output Gap 
 
(continued on next page) 
  





































































Panel C: Responding to Output Growth 
 
Panel D: Interest Smoothing 
 
Notes: Trend inflation rate is on the horizontal axis.  The response to inflation in the Taylor rule is on the vertical axis.  
The basic Taylor rule has zero response to output gap and output growth rate as well as no interest rate smoothing. 
Forward rules respond to expected values of macroeconomic variables (j = 1) while the contemporaneous rules respond 
to current values of macroeconomic variables (j = 0).  The model and calibration of parameter is described in the text. 
Panel A: The basic Taylor rule has zero response to output gap and output growth rate as well as no interest rate 
smoothing, i.e.               where    is the inflation rate. Panel B: The simulated policy rule is                
         where    is output gap. Panel C: The simulated policy rule is                            where     is the 
growth rate of output. Panel D:                1             where ρ is the degree of interest smoothing.  For   
















































































Appendix Table A1. Least squares and instrumental variable estimates of the mixed Taylor rule. 
 
pre 1979  post 1982 
OLS IV  IV  OLS IV  IV 
      (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
  ,   1.043  1.171 0.941 2.201 2.535 2.469
(0.308)  (0.339) (0.654)  (0.404)  (0.331) (0.439) 
  ,    -0.002 -0.020 -0.078  1.561 1.196 1.215 
(0.120) (0.109) (0.260)  (0.388) (0.342) (0.452) 
  ,   0.525 0.525 0.482  0.428 0.354 0.353 
(0.134) (0.122) (0.206)  (0.122) (0.110) (0.138) 
    1.340 1.313 1.364  1.052 0.976 1.036 
(0.097) (0.097) (0.159)  (0.096) (0.108) (0.157) 
    -0.436 -0.424 -0.467  -0.129 -0.086 -0.131 
(0.098) (0.099) (0.161)  (0.099) (0.100) (0.134) 
R
2  0.966 0.966 0.966  0.985 0.984 0.985 
s.e.e.  0.408 0.409 0.409  0.280 0.288 0.283 
  
      
   0.657 0.616 0.624  0.859 0.807 0.826 
p-value Hausman test  0.968 0.985  0.826 0.955 
 
Notes: instrumental variables in columns (2) and (5) are current and past value of inflation from the 
Greenbook. Instrumental variables in columns (2) and (5) are past values of inflation, output growth rate, and 
output gap from the Greenbook. Instrumented variables are in bold. The null hypothesis in the Hausman test is 




Appendix Table A2. Effect of including policy shocks on the estimated policy responses to inflation, output 
growth rate, output gap, and interest rate smoothing. 
 





   with policy 












  ,   2.109 2.050 0.815 2.201 2.438  0.535
(0.262) (0.249)    (0.404)    (0.382)     
  ,    0.697 0.531  0.384    1.561    1.447    0.767 
(0.225) (0.190)    (0.388)    (0.384)     
  ,   0.723 0.714  0.914    0.428    0.347    0.460 
(0.077) (0.076)    (0.122)    (0.109)     
    0.981 1.020  0.668    1.052    1.018    0.627 
(0.106) (0.089)    (0.096)    (0.071)     
    -0.094 -0.139  0.615    -0.129    -0.080    0.480 
(0.106) (0.089)    (0.099)    (0.070)    
policy shock I  1.271           
(0.410)           
policy shock II        0.809    
      (0.105)    
R
2 0.986  0.988    0.985    0.991    
s.e.e. 0.200  0.189    0.280    0.217    
AIC  -0.323 -0.432   0.326    -0.166    
 
Notes: Policy shock I is from Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005). Policy shock II is the difference between 
the Fed Funds rate assumed in Greenbook forecasts and the target Fed Funds rate chosen by the FOMC. 









Appendix Table A3. Model selection 
Specification Inflation  Output  
growth rate  Output gap  AIC  SIC  Log 
Likelihood
1  Contemp. Contemp. Contemp. 0.737  0.893  -91.31 
2  Forecast Forecast Forecast  0.808  0.965  -100.86 
3  Contemp. Contemp.  Forecast 0.735  0.891  -91.18 
4  Contemp. Forecast Contemp.  0.822  0.979  -102.14 
5  Contemp. Forecast  Forecast  0.830  0.987  -103.32 
6 (baseline)  Forecast Contemp.  Contemp.  0.723  0.880  -88.72 
7  Forecast Forecast  Contemp.  0.794  0.951  -98.92 
8  Forecast Contemp. Forecast  0.724  0.881  -89.09 
 
Notes: the table reports information criteria and log-likelihood for Taylor rules with the baseline and 


















t+1 7.9%  0.0%  99.2%  61.0% 
t+2 5.2%  0.0%  99.3%  61.1% 
t+3 1.9%  0.0%  98.9%  60.9% 
t+4 0.5%  0.0%  97.2%  59.4% 
Average inflation rate a given horizon 
t+1,t+2 (baseline)  7.5%  0.0%  99.4%  62.2% 
t+1 through t+3 5.7%  0.0%  99.2%  62.0% 
t+1 through t+4 3.4%  0.0%  99.1%  61.9% 
 
Notes: The policy reaction function uses estimated coefficients and associated covariance matrix for the mixed 
Taylor rule reported in Table 1.  
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1.  
Woodford (2003, Proposition 6.1) considers second order approximation of  
t
t t EU      (A.1) 
where per period utility is given by 
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where h is the degree of habit formation in consumption. 
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             (A.2) 
where   is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption,    is the elasticity of real marginal cost with 
respect to own output, 
F
t Y is the flexible price level of output at time t, hats denote percent deviations, tip stands for 
terms independent from policy, hot means higher order terms.  
Given assumption about log utility in consumption, we have 
1 (1 ) 0 
    and all second order terms drop. 
Furthermore, from the same assumption we have 
1 1 () / () 1 FF
tt
FF
tt YY Yu Yu
     and  1 F
t
F
t Y Yu   . Hence,  
11 ˆˆ () ( ) tt t t u C hu C X hX hot tip      .   (A.3) 
 
Now consider the expansion of the utility part that corresponds to disutility from labor supply.  
 
2 1
2 ˆˆ (( ) ) ( ) ( 1 )( ) F
t
F
tt t t Y yid i Y yi yi t i p         (A.4) 
where  ˆ ( ) log( ( )/ )
F
tt t yi yi Y   is the deviation of firm i’s output from flexible price level of output  
F
t Y . Compute the 
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    (A.5) 
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Consider the first term  ˆ () it Ey i .  From the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator we have  

1 1 1 1 11
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Combine (A.8) and (A.9) to re-write (A.7) as follows 
2 1
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As we will argue below var (ln(( ( )/ )))
F
it t yi Y  is small in the steady state. Hence, when we use Taylor series 
expansion of the second term we can ignore the variability which arises from the denominator:  
1 1
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where  var (ln(( ( )/ )))
F
tit t yi Y   and  t E  .  We can consider a modification where  
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.  
If we assume that approximation in (A.11) is sufficiently good, then  
  1 1
2 ˆ ˆ ln / ( ) var (ln(( ( )/ )))
FF
tt t i t it t X Y Y E y i y i Y hot


     (A.13) 
which implies that the first order term in (A.5) is equal to 
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If approximation in (A.11) is not satisfactory, then (A.16) would be 
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Now we combine (A.16) and (A.14) to finally get the part which corresponds to the second-order approximation of 
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As Woodford (2003) shows,  (1 ) (1 ) FF
tt YY hu        which follows from the intra-temporal condition for labor 
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We now want to evaluate  ˆ var ( ) it yi in (A.18). To replace variability of output with variability of prices we will use  
ˆ ( ) ln ( ) ln ln ln {ln ( ) ln }
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tt t t t t t yi yi Y Y Y pi P          (A.19) 
Since ln ln
F
tt YY   and ln t P  are the same across firms, we have  
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Define  ln( / ) tt t bB P   (note that in our notation bt is the price relative to current price level) and  log ( ) ti t PE p i   , 
and   
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So that  
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We start with the term ln tt PP  . Note  
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where  (var ln ( )) ti t E Ep i     is the dispersion of prices in the steady state. In the zero trend inflation 
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If we are not satisfied with the quality of the approximation, we can consider 
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 which is close to one. Hence,  
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If we take the approximation as reasonably accurate, we then have 
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.   (A.30) 
Plug (A.30)  and (A.29) into (A.21) to get  
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.   
If we want to use a more precise expression for the ln tt PP   such as (A.28), we would have  
 56 
 









(1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )
[(ln ln ) (ln ) (ln )]
(1 ) [ln ln ]
[ln ] [ln ]
2 [ln ln ][ln
tt t t t t
hot hot




















          
  
   
  
 









] 2 [ln ln ][ln ]
2 [ln ][ln ]
(1 )
[] [ ] 2 []
2[ ] 2 [
tt t t t
tt t t
tt t
pp t pp t t pp t
hot
tp p t p
PP P P P





















    



















    
   
  
And therefore the quality of approximation is not sensitive to adjustments made in (A.28).   
It follows that  
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Note that  is likely to be relatively small. Also note that  ˆ 0 t EX   because  ˆ
t X  is the deviation from steady state. 
Hence  
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So for welfare calculations we should consider  
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Finally, if we are not satisfied with the quality of approximation in (A.11), we would have  
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In the final paragraph, we derive the expression for price and output dispersion in a steady state with a positive trend 
inflation.  Suppose the probability of not being able to reset price is  , trend inflation is , and B is the reset price 
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Since   is small for inflation up to 20%, var ln ( ) 0 it Ep i   . Also note that 
2 ˆ var ( ) var ln ( ) it i t E yi E pi    and 
hence if  var ln ( ) 0 it Ep i   , then  ˆ var ( ) 0 it Ey i  . For example at  1.06   annually and our baseline 
calibration,  ˆ var ( ) 0.05 it Ey i  .  
 